Louisiana State University

LSU Digital Commons
LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses

Graduate School

1971

Labor Union Membership: an Empirical Evaluation of Some of the
Proposed Explanations of Membership Growth.
Timothy Winston Pyron
Louisiana State University and Agricultural & Mechanical College

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses

Recommended Citation
Pyron, Timothy Winston, "Labor Union Membership: an Empirical Evaluation of Some of the Proposed
Explanations of Membership Growth." (1971). LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses. 2164.
https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses/2164

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses by an authorized administrator of LSU
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact gradetd@lsu.edu.

72-17,802

PYRON, Timothy Winston, 1941LABOR UNION MEMBERSHIP:
AN EMPIRICAL EVALUATION
OF SOME OF THE PROPOSED EXPLANATIONS OF MEMBERSHIP
GROWTH.
The Louisiana State University and Agricultural
and Mechanical College, Ph.D. , 1971
Economics, general

!■
I University Microfilms, A XEROXCompany, Ann Arbor, Michigan

THIS DISSERTATION HAS BEEN MICROFILMED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED.

-'3

§

LABOR UNION MEMBERSHIP
An Empirical Evaluation of Some of the
Proposed Explanations of Membership Growth

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in
The Department of Economics

by
Timothy Winston Pyron
M.S., Louisiana State University,
December, 1971

1967

PLEASE NOTE:

Some pages may have
indistinct p rin t.
Filmed as r e c e iv e d .

U n i v e r s i t y M i c r o f i l m s , A Xerox Education Company

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to acknowledge an immeasurable debt to Dr. William J.
Stober, Associate Professor of Economics at the University of Kentucky,
and to Dr. Lamar B. Jones, Associate Professor of Economics at
Louisiana State University in Baton Rouge, for their efforts in super
vising and encouraging the work on this dissertation.

The final prod

uct is free of many flaws contained in earlier drafts because of
their generous gifts of time and attention.

Should the reader still

find fault, his complaint should be directed to the author who, after
all, must bear the ultimate responsibility.
The warmest acknowledgment rightfully goes to the one who
helped because of love.

Thank you, Cynthia, for your understanding

and patience.

ii

)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ...................................................

ii

LIST OF T A B L E S ...................................................

iv

A B S T R A C T ...........................................................

v

Chapter
I. I N T R O D U C T I O N ......................................
II.

1

THE GROWTH OF ORGANIZED LABOR ..............................

8

The Secular Growth of Union Membership
Proposed Explanations of Secular Growth
Short-run Variations in Union Membership Growth
Reasons for Short-run Variations in Membership Growth
III.

BARRIERS TO THE GROWTH OF ORGANIZED L A B O R ...............

39

The Changing Sectoral Concentration of Employment
Difficulties in Extending Organization in Smaller
Communities
Organization Difficulties in Small Firms
Organization Among Female Employees
The Low Organization Rate Among White-Collar Workers
The Low Organization Ratio in the South
Assessing the Theories of Union Membership Growth
IV.

A PROPOSAL FOR TESTING SOME OF THE EXPLANATIONS OF
MEMBERSHIP GROWTH ........................................

75

The Data Used
The Shift-Share Technique
V.

AN EMPIRICAL EVALUATION OF SOME OF THE EXPLANATIONS OF
UNION MEMBERSHIP G R O W T H ..................................

90

The Shift of Employment to Less Unionized Sectors
Production Worker Employment and Union Membership
The Shift of Employment to the South
Summary and Conclusion
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................

iii

121

LIST OF TABLES

Table

* Page

1.

Labor Union Membership in the United States ...............

2.

Short-Run Growth Periods of Union Membership:

3.

The Sectoral Composition of Nonagricultural Employment and
Union Membership: 1958-1968

41

Union Membership and Nonagricultural Employment
1958-1968 .........................

50

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

1894-1968

9
.

21

by Sex:

Union Membership and Employment for White-Collar and BlueCollar Workers:
1960-1968

55

Union Membership and Nonagricultural Employment
for
Selected Regions: 1958 and 1968... .......................

64

Union Membership and Nonagricultural Employment
Selected Sectors: 1958-1968

92

for

Shift-Share Analysis of Union Membership and Nonagricultural
Employment for Selected Sectors:
1958-1968 .............

98

Production Worker Employment for Selected Sectors:
1958-1968 .................................................

103

Decomposition of the Intensification Shift [Sj] in Selected
Sectors to Allow for Shifts in Production Worker
Employment:
1958-1968

110

Nonagricultural Employment in the South for Selected
Sectors:
1958-1968 . . . . ..............................

114

iv

ABSTRACT

Labor union membership in the United States has grown more
rapidly than both the labor force and nonagricultural employment since
1900.

A number of writers have sought to explain the growth behavior

of union membership which, though it has been impressive in the long
run, is characterized by spurts of growth with intermittent slow
growth and even declines.

There is wide agreement that the sporadic

growth of the past has resulted from wars and periods of social
unrest, with some writers adding union leadership as a third explana
tory factor.

However, there is polarization of opinion concerning the

future growth of union membership.

Some writers expect the secular

advance to continue and regard the slow growth of membership since
1954 (and relative decline as a percentage of employment) as tempo
rary.

Other writers, who have been labelled "the saturationists"

argue that the relative decline since 1954 is symptomatic of a crisis
for organized labor because,

in their view, it is due to unfavorable

structural changes in employment.
The saturationists claim that unions have penetrated the most
easily organized areas— male, blue-collar employees working for the
most part for large firms in the manufacturing, mining, construction,
and transportation sectors and located in the larger urban centers of
the East, East North Central, and far West regions.

Unions now face

the more difficult task of organizing the female, nonproduction workers

v

in'small firms, in small towns, in the South and in the service produc
ing sectors of the economy.

Furthermore, these latter categories of

workers are growing more rapidly than those categories which have been
the traditional sources of membership.
The claim that the largely unorganized categories of workers
are less amenable to unionization is crucial to the saturationists’
explanation of the recent relative decline of membership and to their
predilections of crisis.

This study subjects three of the key satura-

tionist arguments to empirical evaluation using data for the period
1958-1968.

The three arguments are:

1)

The decline in the ratio of membership to total employment is
directly related to the relative shift of employment into the
less unionized sectors of employment and away from the more
unionized sectors.

2)

The decline in the ratio of membership to employment in those
sectors where unions are strongest is directly related to the
relative decline of production workers and the relative
increase of white-collar and service workers.

3)

The decline in the ratio of membership to employment is
directly related to the geographical shift of employment out
of the East and East North Central and into the South where
unions are less successful.
The first claim is found to be plausible in light of the

results of a shift-share analysis of sectoral employment.

However,

the same results suggest that-this factor is less important to the
relative decline of membership than the failure of unions in the more
unionized sectors to grow apace with employment in those sectors.
Both correlation and shift-share analyses of sectoral changes in
production-worker employment, total employment, and union membership

vi

indicate little basis for expecting membership to be more closely
related to changes in production-worker employment than to changes in
total employment (including white-collar and service workers).
Finally,

there does appear to be a significant correlation between the

sectoral shifts of employment to the South and the slow growth of
union membership.

However, employment has also been shifting to the

Pacific region where union membership is a higher percentage of employ
ment than in the East and East North Central regions.

Thus, the geo

graphical shifts of employment are an indecisive factor in the decline
of the organization ratio for the nation as a whole.
In conclusion, the relative decline in union membership that
occurred between 1958 and 1968 must be largely attributable to factors'
other than the three examined here.

These arguments of the saturation

ists are not sufficient to explain the recent relative decline of mem
bership and are a questionable basis for predicting the stagnation or
decline of the labor movement.

vii

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Although the American trade union and its precursors date from
colonial times,

the development of unions was fragmentary and sporadic

until the end of the nineteenth century.

Leo Wolman estimated that in

1900 there were less than 900,000 union members in the United States.^This membership was only 3.0 per cent of the civilian labor force and .
6.1 per cent of total-nonagricultural e m p l o y m e n t . ^

The Bureau of Labor

Statistics has estimated that by 1968 there were 18,916,000 union mem
bers in the United States--more than twenty-one times as many as the
O

1900 figure.

It is more significant that union membership grew faster

than either the civilian labor force or nonagricultural employment.
Membership in 1968 was 23.0 per cent of the civilian labor force and
27.9 per cent of total nonagricultural employment.^

This long-run

growth was not the result of steady expansion but of short-run spurts of

^Leo Wolman, Ebb and Flow in Trade Unionism (New York:
Bureau of Economic Research, 1936), p. 16.

National

^Leo Troy, "Trade Union Membership, 1897-1962," Review of Eco
nomics and Statistics. XLVII (February, 1965), 94.
3
U.S., Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Handbook
of Labor Statistics 1970 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1970), p. 339.
(Hereinafter cited as: U.S. Department of Labor,
Handbook 1970.)

^Ibid.

See below, Table 1, p„ 9.
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growth which outweighed the intermittent periods of slow growth, stag
nation, and even decline in membership.

The most dramatic growth in

this long period occurred during the two decades, 1933-1954, following
the abrupt change in public policy toward unions which culminated in
the passage of the National Labor Relations Act in 1935.

Along with

the impressive growth in union membership organized labor also acquired
power and influence in the economic structure of the nation as well as
in the political arena.
After 1954 membership declined for several years and then
resumed its growth but at a slower rate than nonagricultural employ
ment, so that membership continued to decline relative to employment.
JThe absolute and relative decline following 1954 is not so important
because of its magnitude but because it inspired controversial and
opposing viewpoints about the causes of the decline and its meaning
for the future of the labor movement.
Several students of the U.S. labor movement have suggested
explanations for the secular growth of union membership and for the
short-run deviations from the long-run trend of slow growth.'*

One

group of writers described the decline following 1954 as another

^In addition to those cited in the following two footnotes,
mention should be made of John R. Commons and Helen L. Sumner, A Docu
mentary History of American Industrial Society (Glendale, Calif.:
Arthur H. Clark Co., 1910), V; Robert F. Hoxie, Trade Unionism in the
United Stafes (New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1921); and Joseph
Shister, "The Logic of Union Growth," Journal of Political Economy.
LXI (October, 1953), 413-33.

3
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temporary lull in the secular advance of the labor movement.

They

predicted a renewal of more rapid growth with the advent of propitious
short-run conditions.
However, other students of labor began to predict a secular
decline in the relative strength of the labor movement.^

As early as

1950 the editors of Fortune predicted that union organizing would
thereafter be a difficult task.®

By the 1960s many writers were say

ing that the union movement is at a crossroads, and that concerted,
sustained effort is required to prevent permanent stagnation or even
decline in the relative size of organized labor.

In a survey of union

leaders and staff published in 1963 there was significant agreement
with these statements:

a state of crisis exists, organized labor has

®See, for example, Bernstein, "The Growth of American Unions,"
American Economic Review, XLIV (June, 1954), 318; Philip Taft, "Is
There a Crisis in the Labor Movement? No," in The Crisis in the Ameri
can Trade-Union Movement, ed. by Solomon Barkin and Albert Blum, The
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, CCCL
(Philadelphia: November, 1963), p. 11.
^See Joseph Shister, "The Direction of Unionism 1947-1967:
Thrust or Drift?" Industrial and Labor Relations Review, XVII (July,
1967), 578-601; "The Outlook for Union Growth," in The Crisis in the
American Trade-Union Movement, ed. by Solomon Barkin and Albert Blum,
The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,
Vol. 350 (Philadelphia; November, 1963), pp. 55-62; Edward Townsend,
"Is There a Crisis in the American Trade Union Movement? Yes," in
The Crisis in the American Trade-Union Movement, pp. 1-9; Albert A.
Blum, "Labor at the Crossroads," Harvard Business Review, XLII (JulyAugust, 1964), 6-8; and Solomon Barkin, The Decline of the Labor
Movement and What Can Be Done About It, a report to the Center for the
Study of Democratic Institutions (Santa Barbara, Calif.:
The Fund for
the Republic Inc., 1961), p. 6. (Hereinafter cited as The Decline of
the Labor Movement.)
^"Obstacles to Future Union Growth," Fortune. XLI (April,
1950), 51-54.
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suffered a damaging loss of vitality, and collective bargaining power
is growing weaker.

9

Most respondents disagreed with the statement

that "the prospects are bright and future secure."
dent professed to fear the " . . .
force in the economy . . . "

One union presi

eventual elimination of unions as a

and one staff member answered, " . . .

there is little in sight to suggest that labor's difficulties can be
met and overcome.
By far the most compelling evidence of crisis in the eyes of
most of these writers was the decline, both absolute and relative, of
union membership after 1954.

It must be recognized that union member

ship is not a perfect index of the strength of the trade union move
ment.

At any given time this measure may give an erroneous impression

of the bargaining strength of unions, of their performance with
respect to serving their members, or of the internal stability or
political effectiveness of unions.

For example, the Bureau of Labor

Statistics reported in 1969 that although bargaining elections had
been won in recent years in textile plants in the South few collective
bargaining agreements were signed.^

However, it seems reasonable to

9

Solomon Barkin and Albert A. Blum, "Is There a Crisis in the
American Trade-Union Movement?--The Trade Unionists' Views," in The
Crisis in the American Trade-Union Movement, ed. by Solomon Barkin and
Albert A. Blum, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and
Social Science, Vol. 350 (Philadelphia; November, 1963), pp. 16-24.
10Ibid., p. 17.
■^U.S., Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Labor
in the Textile and Apparel Industries, Bulletin #1635 (Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 43.
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assume a high correlation between membership and the other factors
which describe the viability of the union movement.

Solomon Barkin

stated the case well.
Union leaders know that an institution that does not grow tends to
stagnate and atrophy, and that the trade union movement cannot
adequately serve its following if it is not expanding. . . . It
must constantly seek to capture the leadership of new unorganized
groups in order to maintain the buoyancy of social leadership, the
role of.innovator in working conditions and employee benefits, and
the position of social and industrial critic to which it is
committed.12
Furthermore, there is really no statistical substitute for membership
in attempting to gauge union growth.
The various obstacles to future union membership growth which
have been cited in the literature fall into three categories.

First,

some writers refer to factors within the labor movement itself, citing
a loss of crusading spirit and revolutionary vitality on the part of
the leadership,

13

and growing apathy if not alienation on the part of

their constituents.-^

Second, others cite a growing public hostility

to unions which is reflected in less favorable legislative treatment

12

^Barkin, The Decline of the Labor Movement, p. 6.

l^See Shister, "The Outlook for Union Growth," p. 59; Blum,
"Labor at the Crossroads," p. 6; Barkin, The Decline of the Labor Move
ment, p. 25; and Barkin and Blum, "Is There a Crisis in the American
Trade-Union Movement?--The Trade Unionists' Views," p. 20.
■^See Townsend, "Is There a Crisis in the American Trade-Union
Movement? Yes," p. 2; Barkin, The Decline of the Labor Movement, p.
16; George Strauss, "Union Bargaining Strength:
Goliath or Paper
Tiger?" in The Crisis in the American Trade-Union Movement, ed. by
Barkin and Blum, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and
Social Science, Vol. 350 (Philadelphia; November, 1963), pp. 89-90.
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and perhaps also has encouraged stronger opposition on the part of
m a n a g e m e n t . A third general class of suggested obstacles arises
from the observation that structural changes in the economy have
shifted employment from sectors or areas of traditional union strength
to sectors or areas in which unions have been traditionally weak.

16

The purpose of this dissertation is to test some of the hypo
theses comprising the third group of obstacles, specifically that slow
growth in union membership may be attributed to changes in the indus
trial composition of employment, to the relative decline of production
worker employment,
South.

to the geographical shifts of employment to the

The students who advanced these reasons for the decline in

membership strength offered only the most casual empirical support for
their claims when any was offered at all.
are quite simple:

The tools that are employed

an adaptation of the shift-share analysis used in

■'•■’See Barkin, The Decline of the Labor Movement, pp. 26-29; and
Shister, "The Outlook for Union Growth," pp. 61-62.
^ S e e Barkin, ibid.. pp. 30-52; Joseph Shister, "The Direction
of Unionism 1947-1967: Thrust or Drift?" Industrial and Labor Rela
tions Review, XX (July, 1967), 578-601; "Obstacles to Future Union
Growth," Fortune, pp. 51-54; Everett M. Kassalow, "Occupational Fron
tiers of Trade Unionism in the United States," Industrial Relations
Research Association, Proceedings of the Thirteenth Annual Meeting
(Madison, Wis., I960), pp. 166-82; Ray Marshall, "Ethnic and Economic
Minorities: Unions' Future or Unrecruitable?" in The Crisis in the
American Trade-Union Movement, ed. by Solomon Barkin and Albert Blum,
The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,
Vol. 350 (Philadelphia; November, 1963), pp. 63-73; Benjamin Solomon
and Robert K. Burns, "Unionization of White-Collar Employees:
Extent,
Potential and Implications," Journal of Business, XXXVI (April, 1963),
160-65; Robert K. Burns, "Unionization of the White-Collar Worker,"
Readings in Labor Economics and Industrial Relations, ed. by Joseph
Shister (Chicago: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1951), pp. 56-66.
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regional economics supplemented by rank correlation.

The data used

are subject to certain limitations, as discussed in Chapter IV, but
are sufficient for the purposes at hand.
The growth experience of the U.S. labor movement is presented
in some detail in Chapter II, both in its long-run and short-run
aspects.

The explanations for this growth which have been offered by

various students of the labor movement are presented along with the
data.

Chapter III focuses on those structural changes in employment

which have been cited as barriers to future growth by some writers.
Chapter IV describes the data and tools to be used in testing some of
those structural barrier explanations.

The description and results of

empirical tests of those explanations are presented in Chapter V along
with the conclusions that can be drawn from the results.

CHAPTER II

THE GROWTH OF ORGANIZED LABOR

The Secular Growth of Union Membership
The overall growth of union membership since the turn of the
century is impressive, although there have been some periods of stag
nation and even of decline.

Table 1 shows that membership in unions

of national scope increased from 447,000 in 1897 to 18,916,000 by
1968.

This forty-twofold increase is equivalent to a cumulative

annual growth rate of approximately 5.4 per cent.

As indicated in

Table 1, most of the growth came in relatively shortjspurts.

Member

ship advanced by varying amounts for a majority of the seventy-two
years covered, but the data show declines for twenty-eight years.
Perhaps a more meaningful datum for describing the growth of
>
■
union strength is the extent of organization, i.e., the proportion of
eligible employees, or potential members, who are union members.

The

term "real membership" is commonly applied to the proportion of the
potential which is organized.

Several concepts of potential member

ship have been employed in the literature for calculating real membership, two of which are incorporated in Table 1.

^Nonagricultural employment was used by Wolman to measure the
extent of organization in his pathbreaking Ebb and Flow in Trade Union
ism (ibid., pp. 110-25). Both nonagricultural employment and the
civilian labor force were used by Irving Bernstein and Leo Troy for

8

TABLE 1
LABOR UNION MEMBERSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES
PART A:

1897-1934

Membership as a Percentage of
Membership3
Number

Change

Total Labor
Force*5

(000's)

(000's)

(Per Cent)

Year

1897
1898
1899
1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
1915

447
501
611
869
1,125
1,376
1,914
2,073
2,022
1,907
2,080
2,131
2,006
2,141
2,343
2,452
2,716
2,687
2,583

+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
-

d
54
110
258
256
251
538
159
50
115
173
50
125
135
203
109
264
29
105

d
d
d
3.0
3.8
4.5
6.0
6.4
6.0
5.5
5.8
5.8
5.4
5.6
6.1
6.3
6.9
6.8
6.4

Nonagricultural
Employment3

Membership as a Percentage of
Membership 3

(Per Cent)
3.5
3.9
4.4
6.1
7.4
8.4
11.3
12.3
11.2
10.0
10.6
11.3
9.9
10.2
10.9
11.0
11.9
12.0
11.5

Number

Change

Total Labor
Force*5

(000's)

(000's)

(Per Cent)

(Per Cent)

6.9
7.5
8.4
10.0
12.0
11.3
9.4
8.3
7.9
7.8
7.6
7.6
7.3
7.0
6.8
6.7
6.2
5.8
6.9

11.2
12.0
13.5
16.0
18.5
19.6
15.6
12.8
12.6
12.2
11.7
11.8
11.6
11.0
11.5
12.6
13.3
12.5
13.9

Year

1916
1917
1918
1919
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934

+
+
+
+
+
+
+

2,773
3,061
3,467
4,125
5,048
4,781
4,027
3,622
3,536
3,519
3,502
3,547
3,480
3,443
3,393
3,358
3,144
2,973
3,609

aLeo Troy, "Trade Union Membership, 1897-1962," Review of Economics and Statistics. XLVII (February,
last five entries of the last column were calculated from Troy's data.
^Irving Bernstein, "The Growth of American Unions," American Economic Review. XLIV, No. 3 (June,

190
289
406
658
923
267
754
405
86
17
17
44
67
37
50
35
214
171
636

Nonagricultural
Employment3

1965), Tables 1 and 2, pp. 93-94.

The

1954), 303.

VO

TABLE 1— Continued
PART B:

1930-1968

Membership as a Percentage of
Membership0

1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949

Nonagricultural
Employment0

Number

Change

Total Labor
Force0

(000's)

(000's)

(Per Cent)

(Per Cent)

3,401
3,310
3,050
2,689
3,088
3,584
3,989
7,001
8,034
8,763
8,717
10,201
10,380
13,213
14,146
14,322
14,395
14,787
14,319
14,282

d
91
260
361
+
399
+
496
+
405
+ 3 012
+ 1 033
+
729
46
+ 1 484
+
179
+ 2 833
933
+
+
176
+
73
392
+
468
37
-

6.8
6.5
6.0
5.2
5.9
6.7
7.4
12.9
14.6
15.8
15.5
17.7
17.2
20.5
21.4
21.9
23.6
23.9
23.1
22.7

11.6
12.4
12.9
11.3
11.9
13.2
13.7
22.6
27.5
28.6
26.9
27.9
25.9
31.1
33.8
35.5
34.5
33.7
31.9
32.6

Year

Membership as a Percentage of
Membership0
Number

Change

Total Labor
Force0

Nonagricultural
Employment0

(000's)

(000's)

(Per Cent)

(Per Cent)

14,267
15,946
15,892
16,948
17,022
16,802
17,490
17,369
17,029
17,117
17,049
16,303
16,586
16,524
16,841
17,299
17,940
18,367
18,916

15
+ 1,679
54
+ 1,056
74
+
220
+
688
121
340
88
+
68
746
283
+
62
317
+
+
458
+
641
+
427
+
549

22.3
24.5
24.2
25.5
25.4
24.7
25.2
24.9
24.2
24.1
23.6
22.3
22.6
22.2
22.2
22.4
22.7
22.7
23.0

31.5
33.3
32.5
33.7
34.7
33.2
33.4
32.8
33.2
32.1
31.4
30.2
29.8
29.2
28.9
28.4
28.1
28.0
27.9

Year

1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968

c U.S., Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics Handbook of Labor Statistics 1970, Bulletin 1666 (Washington, D.C .:
1970), p. 339. Canadian membership is excluded.
Note: The membership data for Part A include Canadian membership, whereas the data for Part B exclude Canadian membership,
d
Not available.

Government Printing Office,
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As a proportion of the civilian labor force, union membership
grew from 3.0 per cent in 1900 to a peak of 25.5 per cent in 1953.
Thus, the proportion of the labor force which is organized grew by a
multiple of eight from its 1900 level to its peak in 1953.

Since non

agricultural employment^is necessarily smaller than the labor force,
membership as a proportion of nonagricultural employment is always
larger than membership as a proportion of the labor force.

In 1900

union membership was 6.1 per cent of total nonagricultural employment,
and in its peak year, 1945, this proportion was 35.5 per cent.

Between

1900 and 1945 there was a sixfold increase in the proportion of non
agricultural employment that is organized and a sevenfold increase in
the proportion of the labor force that is organized.

The divergent

measures of relative strength.
See Bernstein, '.'The Growth of American
Unions," American Economic Review, XLIV (June, 1954), 303; and "The
Growth of American Unions, 1945-1960," Labor History, II (Spring, 1961),
134. See also, Leo Troy, "Trade Union Membership, 1897-1962," Review
of Economics and Statistics, XLVII (February, 1965), 94-95. As Troy
points out (ibid.), there are some in the labor force who are not,
practically speaking, potential union members.
Specifically, we should
exclude all those who are proprietors or managers, most of the selfemployed, and persons in certain occupat ions which are considered to
be beyond the domain of unionism, e.g., private household workers and
many professionals. Benjamin Solomon deducted most of those groups
from the civilian labor force to arrive at his measure of the union
potential in "Dimensions of Union Growth," Industrial and Labor Rela
tions Review, IX (July, 1956), 544-46. In a study limited to manufac
turing industries, Ferguson and Stober used the number of production
workers as a gauge of the extent of organization. See C. E. Ferguson
and W. J. Stober, "Estimates of Union Membership from Reports Filed
Under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act," The Southern
Economic Journal. XXXIII (October, 1966), 174. The nonagricultural
employment data used in Table 1 do not include proprietors, the selfemployed, unpaid family workers, or domestic workers in households.
See U.S. Department of Labor, Handbook 1970, p. 4.
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growth in the ratios is due to the more rapid growth of nonagricultu
ral employment (which reflects the decline in agricultural employment).

Proposed Explanations of Secular Growth
In spite of some periods in which union membership declined
the important point is that the membership of labor unions has grown
substantially over the last seventy years, both in absolute numbers
and as a proportion of the labor force and nonagricultural employment.
A number of writers have sought to explain the emergence of trade
unions,

but only a few have attempted to explain the growth of the

union movement.

Three in particular have contributed explanations for

membership growth:
Bernstein."*

Horace B. Davis, John T. Dunlop, and Irving

Bernstein and Dunlop have contributed the most comprehen

sive explanations for the secular growth of membership, and all three

o

See, for example, Sidney and Beatrice Webb, Industrial Democ
racy (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1897); and also their History
of Trade Unionism (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1894); Frank
Tannenbaum, The Labor Movement, Its Conservative Functions and Social
Consequences (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1921); Robert F. Hoxie,
Trade Unionism in the United States (New York: D. Appleton and Co.,
1921); Selig Perlman, A Theory of the Labor Movement (New York: Mac
millan Co., 1928); John R. Commons and Helen L. Sumner, A Documentary
History of American Industrial Society (Glendale, Calif.: Arthur H.
Clark Co., 1910), V; John R. Commons, History of Labor in the United
States (New York: Macmillan Co., 1918), I; and Joseph Shister, "The
Logic of Union Growth," Journal of Political Economy, LXI (October,
1953), 413-33.
^See Horace B. Davis, "The Theory of Union Growth," Quarterly
Journal of Economics, LV (August, 1941), 611-33; John T. Dunlop, "The
Development of Labor Organization," in Insights into Labor Issues, ed.
by Joseph Shister and Richard A. Lester (New York: Macmillan, 1948),
pp. 163-93; and Irving Bernstein, :The Growth of American Unions,"
American Economic Review, XLIV (June, 1954), 301-18.
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men have contributed to the explanations of short-run variations about
the secular trend.
After delineating necessary conditions for the emergence of
unionism,^ Dunlop suggested two broad environmental factors as deter
minants of long-run growth:

the community institutions embodied in

the legal system, the educational system, the communication media, the
economic system and political organizations; and the value judgments
and mores that permeate the society.-*
Bernstein summarized the factors which explain secular growth
under four headings:

the growth of the labor force and employment;

the growing acceptability of unionism; the increased homogeneity of
the labor force; and the spread of union security agreements.
Bernstein observed the slow but steady growth of the labor
force, and the concomitant growth of employment, and postulated:

"Even

if nothing else were at work, one would expect the labor movement to
expand at this slow rate."^

He did not explain this relationship any

more than to say that the growth of employment expands the potential

^Dunlop's necessary conditions are:
(1) that the workers must
occupy a strategic position in the technological or market structures,
for otherwise they have little power to back up their demands; and
(2) the workers must view their status as wage earners as being perma
nent, for otherwise they may not view their grievances as permanent.
Ibid., pp. 182-83.
^Dunlop, ibid., pp. 184-89.
^Bernstein, "The Growth of American Unions," pp. 313-14.
^Irving Bernstein, "Forces Affecting the Growth of the Ameri
can Labor Movement," in Labor in a Changing America, ed. by William
Haber (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1966), p. 126.
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for union membership, by which he meant a related growth in employment.
A strict interpretation of his statement would tell us to look for a
parametric ratio between membership and employment.

There is nothing

inherent in the expansion of the labor force which will cause union
membership to expand at the same rate, i.e., to maintain a constant
proportion organized.

Indeed, the figures in Table 1 indicate any

thing but constancy in the proportion of either the labor force or
nonagricultural employment that is organized.

At best the expansion

of employment is a permissive factor, allowing membership expansion if
causative factors so dictate.
Bernstein assumed a secular proportionality between growth in
the labor force and growth in employment.

Dunlop refined this point

by pointing to the historical novelty of the high proportion of wage
or salary earners in the labor force.®

Modern technology and the busi

ness corporation have gradually produced a new American society which,
unlike the past, is largely made up of wage and salary earners.
to this transformation, most of the population was self-employed.

Prior
o

As

the labor force has come to be composed of a majority of wage earners,
workers have come to accept the high probability of remaining a wage
earner.

According to Dunlop, one of the conditions for the emergence

and growth of unions is that the worker must feel that his role as an

O

Dunlop, "The Development of Labor Organization," pp. 185-86.
^Stanley Lebergott, "The Pattern of Employment Since 1800," in
American Economic History, ed. by Seymour E. Harris (New York:
McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1961), pp. 290-92 and n. 26, p. 307.
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employee Is permanent, and that present conditions are not transitory
so that he will be willing to attempt remedial action for grievances.
Thus, whereas Bernstein assumed a close relationship, ovei time,
between the labor force and changes in the number employed, Dunlop
\

pointed out the newness of this relationship and its expansionary
effect on unionization.
The second factor which Bernstein suggests is important in the
long-run growth of unions is the gradual acceptance of unionism in
American society, especially among employees.^

It is not easy to

separate cause and effect in assessing this factor, because the growth
of unions could in itself help improve public attitudes toward unions.
Unionism may be more acceptable today at least partly because it has
grown and is now a familiar institution.

It has spread without wreck

ing the system as its opponents had alleged.

On the other hand, a

more favorable public attitude towards unions helps reduce the
obstacles to union organizing and improves the chances of union growth.
Dunlop apparently agrees that there has been a long-run
improvement in the acceptability of unionism.

Dunlop explained the

erstwhile hostility toward unionism as a phenomenon of the prevailing
system of values in the American society.
Professor Schlesinger has summarized the traditional attributes
of the American most noted by foreign observers:
"a belief in the
universal obligation to work; the urge, to move about; a high

^Although casual observation would tend to support Bernstein's
claim that unions have become more acceptable over the years, there is
no documentation of such a trend in the literature, and Bernstein does
not offer any.

16

standard of comfort for the average man; an absence of permanent
class barriers; the neglect of abstract thinking and of the aes
thetic side of life . . . "
Many of these characteristics are to
be traced to the "long apprenticeship to the soil."
It should not be hard to understand why labor organization
would be difficult in a day in which men believed that individual
advancement was to be achieved solely by work, where leisure was a
vice, where economic destiny depended solely upon one's ability to
work and save, where poverty could only be the reward for sloth,
where the poor deserved their fate, and where the public care of
the impoverished was regarded as encouragement of idleness.
•

•

•

One possible gauge of public opinion is public policy.
this indicator gives unclear and even contradictory evidence.

Yet,
Public

policy is reflected in the actions of all three branches of govern
ment, and the three branches have frequently been in disagreement as
to the appropriate approach toward unionism.
ally hostile toward unions prior to the 1930s.

The courts were gener
The Congress, however,

provided favorable legislation for railroad unions as early as 1888*
and the Erdman Act of 1898 provided for mediation and voluntary arbi
tration of labor disputes and prohibited discrimination against union
members and the use of yellow-dog contracts on the railroads.^

Fur

thermore, between 1890 and 1925 at least thirty-three states passed
laws designed to protect unions from various anti-union tactics used
by employers to oppose organization, such as the use of injunctions,

Dunlop, "The Development of Labor Organization," pp. 186-87.
The Schlesinger quotation is from Arthur Meier Schlesinger, "What Then
Is the American, This New Man," American Historical Review, XLVIII
(January, 1943), pp. 3-4.
12
Allan M. Cartter and F. Ray Marshall, Labor Economics (Home
wood, 111.: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1967), p. 386.
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yellow-dog contracts and blacklisting.

13

However, it was not until

the New Deal era, and the reversal of the position held by the Supreme
Court that these acts were interpreted by the courts in a manner favor
able to unions.
The reputation of unions is not untarnished, of course.

The

movement has suffered from public reaction to Communist influence
among the leadership, corrupt leaders, featherbedding and other poli
cies which reduce productivity and efficiency, emergency strikes,
revelations of undemocratic practices within the unions, and infla
tionary wage demands. ^

Employers bolster the negative image and

plead for government sanctions in dealing with

u n i o n s . ^

Solomon

Barkin speculates that the public is troubled by the costliness of
conflict and concerned with the possibility of mutually beneficial
arrangements between unions and large employers at the expense of the
public interest.^
An important consequence of the image of powerful, undemo-*
cratic, corrupt and irresponsible unionism has been the legislation
which has arisen to control the union movement, e.g., the Taft-Hartley
Act, the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act and the

13Ibid..

p.

387.

^See, for example, the reprint of articles from the Wall
Street Journal in A History of Organized Felony and Folly: The Record
of Union Labor in Crime and Economics (New York: The Wall Street
Journal, 1923).
■^Barkin, The Decline of the Labor Movement, p. 62.
16Ibid.
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right-to-work laws in some states.

Public-spirited concern was

buttressed, no doubt, by powerful lobbying on the part of employers.
Opinions differ as to how effectively this legislation has restrained
the growth of union membership.

Barkin states that the laws have been

a serious impediment to new organizational gains.
the Taft-Hartley Act was " . . .

According to him

offered to the public as a means to

curb union bargaining power, to protect the individual's rights against
union pressure, and to secure legal equality between unions and manage
ment.

But its major consequence has been to hamper the growth of

union organization."-^

Not only were structural and procedural

changes made in the way the National Labor Relations Board is to
administer the National Labor Relations Act, but the Board's jurisdic
tion was curtailed.

Perhaps most important of all, the act and its

publicity left the impression that unions are undesirable and do not
represent the true interests of the workers.
Ray Marshall disagrees with Barkin as to the severity of the
impact of the Taft-Hartley Act on union organization.

Marshall's

position is that it has undoubtedly helped employers oppose unions,
but it has been exaggerated as a factor influencing union growth.

1^Barkin, The Decline of the Labor Movement, p. 20.
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Ray Marshall, "Ethnic and Economic Minorities: Unions'
Future or Unrequitable?" in The Crisis in the American Trade-Union
Movement, ed. by Solomon Barkin and Albert Blum, The Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 350 (Philadel
phia; November, 1963), p. 72.
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It is probably true, then, that there is greater public
acceptance of unionism today than existed in the fledgling years of
the movement, and this acceptance has undoubtedly helped union member
ship, although by an indeterminate amount.

On the other hand, the

public may have replaced its ideological objection to unions with
other negative attitudes which are largely born of specific instances.
Unionization has been legitimized, which is partly responsible for its
long-run growth, but it has been subjected to controls from government.
The controls and the reasons which prompted them may have slowed
organization to some extent.

Bernstein argued that on balance union

ism is accepted more readily now.

He noted that the Teamsters' union

suffered most from the exposures of the McClellan Committee, and yet
their membership actually expanded during and after that period when
other unions were declining.

19

A third factor which Bernstein credited with promoting the
long-run growth of American unions is the growing homogeneity of the
American labor force.

He argued that the maintenance of cultural and

ethnic distinctions, including language, impedes unionization; smooth
ing out these differences enhances the unionization effort.^®

Accord

ing to Bernstein, language barriers limit the effectiveness of union
organizers and, along with cultural distinctiveness, limit the accepta
bility of these workers to the existing, English-speaking union

l^Irving Bernstein, "The Growth of American Unions, 19451960," Labor History. II, No. 2 (1961), 157.

20

Bernstein, "The Growth of American Unions," p. 314.

20

members.

In addition, immigrant groups and racial minority groups

have been used by employers as strike breakers which impaired the
acceptability of those groups to existing union members.
The fourth and final factor in Bernstein's analysis of longrun growth in union membership is the spread of union security clauses.
Where such agreements are in force a long-run increase in employment
results in an equivalent increase in union membership.
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Short-run Variations in Union Membership Growth
The secular growth of union membership described by the data
in Table 1 is marked by considerable variety in short-run behavior.
Table 2 describes the short-run periods of growth.

The longer period

may be appropriately separated into two sub-periods:
1934-1968.

1897-1933 and

The data are taken from two different sources which over

lap around this division point.

The end of the first sub-period

coincides with the end of the most severe retrenchment in union mem
bership of the entire survey period, and the beginning of the second
sub-period is approximately contemporaneous with the beginning of the
most impressive of the periods of growth.

This separation also marks

the turning point in the federal government's interest in labor prob
lems and protection of organization rights.
The generally upward long-run movement was interrupted twelve
times by declines lasting from one to six years.

21Ibid.

The magnitudes of
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TABLE 2
SHORT-RUN GROWTH PERIODS OF UNION MEMBERSHIP:

Years
(Inclusive)

Percentage
Change

Absolute
Change
(000's)

1894-1968

Number of Years and
Cumulative Annual
Growth Rate
Years

S'S

CM

363.8% of 1897

Growth Rate

+

1,626

1905-1906

-

166

1907-1909
1910-1913

+
+

99
710

1914-1915

-

133

1916-1920

+

2,465

1921-1923
1924-1931
1932-1933
(1921-1933)

_

(-

1,426
264
385
2,075)

- 28.2% of 1920
- 7.3% of 1923
- 11.5% of 1931
( - 41.1% of 1920)

3
8
2
(13)

10.5%
0.9%
5.9%
4.0%)
(-

1934-1944
1945-1947
(1934-1947)

11,457
+
641
(+ 12,098)

426.1% of 1933
4.5% of 1944
(449.9% of 1933)

11
3
(14)

16.3%
1.5%
+
(+ 12.9%)

-

+

1948-1950

-

520

1951-1953
1954-1956

+
+

2,681
542

1957-1963
1964-1968

•

+

966
2,392

(1898-1968)

(+ 18,469)

-

-

-

-

7 years at

+

8.0% of 1904

2

-

4.1%

5.2% of 1906
35.4% of 1909

3
4

+
+

1.7%
7.9%

4.9% of 1913

2

-

2.5%

95.4% of 1915

5

+ 14.3%

•

1898-1904

-

+

3.5% of 1947

3

-

1.2%

18.8% of 1950
3.2% of 1953

3
3

+
+

5.9%
1.1%

5.5% of 1956
14.5% of 1963

7
5

+

0.8%
2.7%

(71)

(+

5.4%)

(4,131.8% of 1897)

Calculated from Table 1, using Part A of Table 1 for 1897 through
1933 and Part B of Table 1 for 1934 through 1968.
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the year-to-yfear changes varied enormously, both in absolute and per
centage terms.
i
Membership actually declined in 28 (39 per cent) of the 72
years covered by the data.

Most of these years of decline, and all of

those which were most severe in magnitude, occurred in the years
before 1934.

There were 17 years of decline between 1897 and 1934.

Twelve of these occurred in one extended period of contraction lasting
from 1921 through 1933, during which membership fell by about
2,075,000, or 41 per cent of the 1920 total.

The largest reduction in

any single year was the loss of 754,000 members in 1922, which repre
sented 15.8 per cent of the 1921 total.
In contrast, the most significant period of decline after 1934
was from 1957 through 1963.

During that period the overall decline

was less than in 1921-33,--966,000,--and the percentage decline was
much less, only 5.5 per cent of the 1956 total.

The absolute loss in

1961 was almost as large as that in 1922 (746,000 compared to 754,000),but by 1961 the membership base was much larger and the percentage
change for that year was only 4.4 per cent.

The two periods of

decline 1921-1933 and 1957-1963 account for most (17) of the 28 years
of membership decline since 1897.
Within these longer periods of decline there are shorter
periods with significant differences in both absolute and relative
membership losses.

Over two-thirds of the membership loss between

1921 and 1933 took place at the beginning of that period, during 19211923.

The 1,426,000 members lost in those three years represented
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28.2 per cent of the 1920 total.

Those three years of rapid deteriora

tion were followed by eight years of only slow or moderate decline,
including one year, 1927, with a small, temporary increase in member
ship.

Then, during 1932-1933, membership dropped suddenly by 11.5

per cent, a loss of 385,000 members.

Similarly, almost two-thirds of

the total decline of the seven-year period 1957-1963 was concentrated
in a precipitous drop in 1961.
The yearly increases in union membership were also of widely
varying magnitudes.

Membership actually increased in most (61 per

cent) of the years covered, but these increases varied from as little
as 44,000 to over 3,000,000.

Prior to 1934 the largest increase had

taken place in 1920 when 923,000 new members were added— an increase
of 22.4 per cent over the previous year.
increase realized in 1937.

Far larger than that was the

Membership almost doubled in that one year

with 3,012,000 new members, or a 75.5 per cent increase.

There have

been six years since 1934 in which membership grew by more than one
million.
There have been only a few periods of really rapid growth, but
these have provided most of the advances in membership.

Membership

increased by a multiple of 4.6 between 1897 and 1904 with an absolute
increase of 1,626,000 members.

Membership advanced faster than the

long-run rate between 1910 and 1913 when 711,000 new members were
added--a 35.4 per cent increase over 1909.

The next real spurt of

growth occurred between 1916 and 1920, with an absolute increase of
2,465,000 which almost exactly doubled the membership of 1915.
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By 1953 the ratio of membership to the labor force was at its
apex and by 1956 the total number of union members had reached
17,490,000.

The next (and last) two short-run periods listed in

Table 2 (1957-1963 and 1964-1968) were not significant in magnitude of
rate of change, but these are the two most recent periods and the
periods which have sparked controversy about the future of unionism.
>.

Following the new high mark for membership achieved in 1956 there was
a seven-year period during which, with the exception of 1959 and 1962,
membership declined in both absolute and relative strength.

Although

membership began to rise at a steady rate after 1963 the ratio of mem
bership to nonagricultural employment continued to decline through the
end of the period for which there is data.

Reasons for Short-run Variations in Membership Growth
For a long time there was wide acceptance of the idea that
short-run variations in union membership are directly related to, and
sufficiently explained by, the business cycle.
the premier statement of this relationship:

John R. Commons gave

unions grow when business

conditions are good, during the expansive stage of the business cycle;
when business activity turns down, unions suffer defeat and priorities
shift from organization and expansion to political and economic solu
tions to the problems encountered by labor during the recession or
depression.
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Other writers have supported this view or variants of

John R. Commons and Helen L. Sumner, A Documentary History
of American Industrial Society, V, 19.
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it:

Bernstein cited George E. Barnett, Horace B. Davis, Selig Perlman

and Samuel Gompers as advocates.^3
Dunlop stressed the business-cycle aspects of wartime econo
mies and of periods of severe social unrest, which he related primar
ily to business cycles.
wartime " . . .

The expansion of union membership during

is to be explained almost entirely by developments in

the labor market:

the rapid rise in the cost of living and the short

age of labor supply relative to d e m a n d . D u n l o p maintained that the
other periods of rapid advance in union membership followed periods
when economic conditions were particularly bad, and the increase in
union membership " . . .

represented a basic dissatisfaction with the

performance of the economic system and the society in general."

25

Those periods of social unrest which are severe enough to promote mem
bership occur when a short-run business cycle downturn coincides with
the bottom of the long-run, or Kondratieff cycle.

A depression such

as this, following a number of years of deteriorating conditions for
labor, is sufficient to light the fires of fundamental discontent with

^Bernstein, "The Growth of American Unions," p. 309, n. 5.
^ J o h n T. Dunlop, "The Development of Labor Organization:
A
Theoretical Framework," in Insights into Labor Issues, ed. by Richard
A. Lester and Joseph Shister (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1948),
p. 190.
^-*Ibid., p. 191. Note that Commons linked membership growth
to the expansive phase of the business cycle, and Dunlop stressed the
importance of the depression phase of the cycle. The two views are
not inconsistent if, as per Davis (below), the depression creates in
workers the desire to unionize and the beginning of the recovery
enables them to unionize because the labor market is tighter.
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the system.

Then workers seek the power to change the economic struc

ture surrounding them.
Horace B. Davis concluded that union growth proceeds by waves
which are not closely synchronized with those of the business cycle.
However, he stressed conditions which may respond to the cycle.

Davis

argued that workers accumulate grievances in the period preceding mem
bership growth, and that this is a prerequisite to membership expan
sion.

Of equal importance, the workers must be in an improved position

in the labor market so that they have some leverage or bargaining
power.

Thus, the revival from a depression is much more conducive to

membership growth than the depths, for then the labor market conditions
are more favorable.

Davis also emphasized his belief that the direc

tion of movement of economic indicators, e.g., indices of employment
and prices, is more important than their absolute level in assessing
the conditions facing labor for the purpose of explaining membership
growth.^
Bernstein tested the business cycle theory and concluded that
it possesses little predictive value.^7

He compared membership changes

to the business cycle in four tests:
(1)

He checked to see if the overall movement of membership was
consistent

within the different short-run periods of economic

expansion or contraction.
f

^ H o r a c e B. Davis, "The Theory of Union Growth," Quarterly
Journal of Economics. LV, No. 4 (1941), 631-33.
27

Bernstein, "The Growth of American Unions," pp. 310-13.
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(2)

He compared the direction of year-to-year changes In the
overall level of economic activity and the number of union
members.

(3)

He measured the coefficient of correlation between year-toyear percentage changes in membership and year-to-year per
centage changes in the indexes of each of four business cycle
indicators--consumer prices, employment, wholesale prices,
and industrial production.

(4)

He compared the direction of year-to-year movements in real
membership (membership as a proportion of the civilian labor
force) with the direction of year-to-year movements in each
of the same four indexes of the business cycle.
Bernstein's data delineate five important recessions between

1901 and 1948 (his study period) with no consistent behavior in mem
bership during then.

Membership rose dramatically during one of them,

rose moderately during two of them, dropped modestly during one, and
declined sharply during one.

Seven periods of business expansion are

included in the period 1901-1948.

Membership increased sharply during

four of these, increased modestly during one upswing, remained stable
during one, and suffered its most serious decline of its history dur
ing one.

In other words, the relationship between membership growth

and the major business cycle is not at all well defined.
When year-to-year changes in membership and the level of busi
ness activity are compared, there is little correspondence even in the
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direction of these movements, much less in the amplitude of the
fluctuationsi
In correlating year-to-year movements in the proportion of the
labor force which is unionized (which he called real membership) and
contemporaneous movements in four of the best known indicators of busi
ness activity, Bernstein used the percentage change each year for each
series.

The correlation coefficients derived are below any meaningful

level of significance.

By far the best "fit" exists between the per

centage change in consumer prices and the percentage change in real
membership, but even here the coefficient of correlation is only + .39.,
In fact, in 40 per cent of the years these two series moved in oppo
site directions.

The correlation coefficient between percentage

changes in real membership and percentage changes in employment is
+ .04, which is so low that it fails to indicate any relationship what
soever.

However, the correlation of percentage changes in the number

of employees and in the number of union members yields a higher,
though still not significant, correlation coefficient of + .25.

In 46

per cent of the years these two series moved in opposite directions.
The coefficient of correlation with percentage changes in wholesale
prices was only + .23 and that with percentage changes in industrial
production (+ .009) was even less significant.
Bernstein concluded that the individual instances of relation
ship between the business cycle and membership are sporadic and are
counter-balanced by contrary experiences, and at best, the cycle merely
contributes to growth along with other factors in specific historical
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situations.

He denies the existence of a monocausal relationship

between membership and the business cycle.
Bernstein also addressed himself to the question:
union membership respond closely to the business cycle?

Why doesn't
He alluded to

a statement by Wesley Clair Mitchell that no activity will respond
regularly to business cycles unless man controls the activity and
man's exercise of this control is swayed by short-run economic considerations, whether he is conscious of the influence or not.
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Bernstein

maintained that a worker is only rarely influenced directly by shortrun economic considerations when it comes to his decision to join or
not join a union.

Davis had suggested that there is a great deal of

inertia among workers that the usual business cycle is unable to
overcome.29
Bernstein, though rejecting the monocausal influence of the
business cycle in union membership growth, included this factor among
others in a pluralistic explanation of short-run trends.

Building on

on

Dunlop's emphasis of wars and periods of social unrest,

he included

several additional ramifications of those events which affect union
growth.

Bernstein enumerated five factors which encourage union

growth during a time of war.

The first is the increase in business

^®W. C. Mitchell, What Happens During Business Cycles. A Prog
ress Report (New York, 1951), p. 95. Quoted in Bernstein, "The Growth
of American Unions," p. 313.
^Davis, "The Theory of Union Growth," p. 631.
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Dunlop, "The Development of Labor Organization:
retical Framework," ibid.
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activity, most importantly the accompanying price rise and the higher
cost of living.

Rising prices and high levels of employment and pro

duction are characteristic of economic mobilization for a war effort.
As discussed above, Bernstein argued that the relationship of member
ship to employment and production is relatively remote.

However, real

wages may depreciate rapidly enough to stir workers on to organization
in order to lift their money wages.3^

This describes the situation in

both World Wars and the Korean War, but it is not applicable to the
Spanish-American War, which Bernstein interpreted as evidence that
39
social unrest was the cause of membership expansion during that war. ‘
A second factor favoring membership growth during a war is the
enlarged role of government, both as employer and as principal con
sumer of the product of private industry.

The exigencies of war cause

the government to seek stability in the labor force and therefore to
seek union support for the war effort.

This prompts the government to

influence employers, especially those selling to the government, to
avoid hostility with unions.

Thus, unions find it easier to achieve

organization goals when they deal with the government or with an
employer who relies heavily on government sales during a war.

Bern

stein states that it is "no coincidence" that the railroad nonoperat
ing crafts first won recognition during the period of federal control
in World War I and lost their recognition upon the return of control

^Bernstein, "The Growth of American Unions," p. 315.
32Ibid.
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to the private sector, or that the shipbuilding and airframe indus
tries were unionized during the world

w a r s .
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Bernstein further contends that wartime benefits unionism
because the government is induced to enlist unions, among other impor
tant elements in society, in the formulation of policy and administra
tion of matters of direct interest to them in order to be assured of
their support in the common effort.

Thus, union representatives are

appointed to administrative boards and agencies (e.g., the War Labor
Boards and the Wage Stabilization Board) which enhances the prestige,
respectability and acceptability of unions in the eyes of workers,
employers and the public.3^
In addition to the pressures government places on employers,
which were noted above, Bernstein states that employer hostility is
mitigated by other forces.

The employer is vulnerable to the charge

of inciting a strike at a time of national emergency and scarcities.
It is easier and simpler to pass union wage gains on to the consumer
33

in higher prices. J

Finally, wartime is characterized by heightened social ten
sions due to dislocations, changes in everyday life, concern and
anxiety over the war effort, and the strain to produce as much as pos
sible.

Unions provide a means of expressing frustrations.

33Ibid.
34Ibid., pp. 315-16.
33Ibid.
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Of a different nature are the forces increasing union member
ship during periods of social unrest.

These factors " . . .

arise only

in the wake of a depression so severe as to call into question the
very foundations of society."
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Secondary or less severe downturns in

business activity do not produce this effect.

In the severe depres

sions of both 1893 and 1929 the expansion of union membership began
four years after the onslaught of the depression.

The unions decline

as the cycle descends to its trough, because their ability to bargain
effectively is seriously reduced.

The gains in membership occur only

after the recovery has begun and labor's bargaining position is
strengthened.
Bernstein cited three depression-born factors which spur union
growth.
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The worker and his family are heavily burdened by the unem

ployment effects of a depression.

They develop sharp grievances

against the existing social order, and they are more willing to join
organizations which seek to change the social order or at least thfe
unsatisfactory economic conditions.

These organizations could be

either political or economic, but in this country they are more likely
to choose the latter.®®
Secondly,

the employer-businessman and the system he repre

sents is discredited during an economic failure, and public sympathy
36

Bernstein, "Forces Affecting the Growth of the American
Labor Movement," p. 129. See also Dunlop, ibid., pp. 191f.
■^Bernstein, "The Growth of American Unions," pp. 316-17.
38Ibid.
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for the employer in labor relations thus is lessened.

He is less able

to rally public opinion or government or judicial support to his cause
in opposing union organization.
Finally, the government is more likely to take an active part
in promoting the interests of the worker during this time of high unem
ployment and widespread deprivation, e.g., the Erdman Act of 1898
which outlawed yellow-dog contracts and the National Labor Relations
Act of 1935.39
To summarize, membership has expanded in the short-run, accord
ing to the Bernstein-Dunlop thesis, due to the consequences attendant
to wars and very severe depressions and has been influenced by the
quality of union leadership.

The long-run forces have been the

expanding labor force, the increasing social acceptability of union
ism, the increasing homogeneity of the working class, and the exten
sion of union security provisions in collective bargaining contracts.
According to this analytical structure, the long-run trend is positive
growth of membership.

Bernstein sanguinely predicted:

If the forces we have emphasized continue at work in the future,
unionism will grow steadily in the long run, will suffer little
or no loss in bad times, and will expand sharply if we are so
unfortunate as :to engage in wars or to sustain severe
depressions."40
Bernstein apparently expected the forces to continue.

39Ibid.
^Bernstein, "The Growth of American Unions," p. 318.
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The short-run declines, and pointedly that which followed
1954, should not be cause for despair among union supporters, accord
ing to the Bernstein-Dunlop thesis.^

The decline in membership fol

lowing 1954, and the continuing decline in the ratio of membership to
nonagricultural employment is not inconsistent with the explanations
offered by Dunlop and Bernstein, and it would thereby be considered a
>■

temporary reversal.

The fact that the ratio of membership to the

labor force began to rise again after 1964 while the ratio of member
ship to nonagricultural employment continued to decline is explained
by declining unemployment and the continuing contraction of the agri
cultural sector.

The escalation of the Vietnam conflict coincides

with the renascence of membership growth, thus lending some support to
the wartime expansion thesis.
There is another school of thought, however, whose adherents
speak of a crisis for organized labor because they do not draw the
same conclusions as Bernstein and Taft with respect to the prospects
for future union growth.

Among the most articulate statements of the

"crisis for labor" are those by Joseph Shister, Edward Townsend,
AO

Albert A. Blum, and Solomon Barkin.

ment?

^ S e e also, Philip Taft,"Is There a Crisis in the Labor Move
No," pp. 11-15.

^ S e e Shister, "The Direction of Unionism 1947-1967: Thrust or
Drift?" pp. 578-601; "The Outlook for Union Growth," pp. 55-62; Edward
Townsend, "Is There a Crisis in the American Trade Union Movement?
Yes," pp. 1-9; Albert A. Blum, "Labor at the Crossroads," pp. 6-8; and
Solomon Barkin, The Decline of the Labor Movement, p. 7.
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According to Shister,
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the short-run factors that stimulated

union membership growth in the past were wars, severe depressions, and
poor personnel policies and practices--all of which operate by giving
rise to worker discontent.

However, he argues, the advent of modern

fiscal and monetary policies reduce the likelihood of severe depres
sions in the future, and the personnel relations techniques of modern
management have improved substantially.^

Thus, two of the three

external factors responsible for growth in the past may well not be
present in the future.
Shister views these external factors as setting limits within
which membership growth takes place and leadership as determining the
actual growth achievement within these constraints.^^
B a r k i n , ^ and others , ^

^Shister,

For Shister,

leadership plays a crucial role in determining

"The Outlook for Union Growth," p. 56.

44Ibid., pp. 57-58.
It should be emphasized that it is the
severe depression which Shister is discounting. Recessions will
undoubtedly occur, but these have not been sufficient in the past to
stimulate membership growth. Barkin adds that any long-term unemploy
ment would probably be concentrated among the old, the young, and the
marginal worker and that these groups do not possess the bargaining
power necessary for free collective bargaining to solve their problems.
Therefore, he concludes, it will be political solutions that they will
seek, not the protection of unions.
(See Barkin, The Decline of the
Labor Movement, p. 25.)
^ J o s e p h Shister, "The Logic of Union Growth," Journal of
Political Economy, LXI (October, 1953), 429.
^Barkin, The Decline of the Labor Movement, p. 53.
^Blum, "Labor at the Crossroads," pp. 6-8; Davis also placed
emphasis on the importance of leadership in determining the growth of
union membership, although he did not argue (as per Shister and Blum)
that leadership has lost its aggressiveness.
(See Davis, "The Theory
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union membership growth.

Moreover, these writers point to several

reasons why current and future leadership may not aggressively pursue
new members.
First,

the majority of union leaders are business-unionists

and their primary incentive for organizing new members is to protect
or enhance bargaining gains.

Unless this incentive is present as, for

example, when organized workers are confronted by nonunion competition
in the product market,

Shister maintains that it is not in the inter

est of union leaders to make large commitments of resources to organi
zation efforts.

Shister recognizes, however, that this argument must

be qualified in that some leaders are wedded to the social unionism
philosophy and thus have a vital and immediate interest in promoting
unionism.

Further,

the increased reliance on political channels to

achieve the ends of organized labor has increased the incentive for
membership expansion.^®
Second, even though there may be an incentive for expansion,
the growing complexities of union administration reduce the time
available to devote to organizing activities.
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As Barkin has pointed

of Union Growth," p. 632.) Bernstein attached little importance to
the leadership factor in the long run, but he acknowledged that par
ticular successes of the past in organization have been largely
attributable to the personal achievement of key individuals, e.g.,
John L. Lewis in the industrial organization drive in the late 1930s.
(Bernstein, "The Growth of American Unions," p. 317.)
AQ

^ “Shister, "Unresolved Problems and New Paths for American
Labor," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, IX (April, 1956), 448.
^Barkin,

p. 57.
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out, union officers tend to gravitate to administration and the job of
organizing falls to the younger and less experienced personnel who
lack adequate training."’®
Third, to extend the boundaries of organized labor into many
of the currently unorganized areas, as for example small firms or
offices and the South, would require coordination at the federation
level.

Federation leadership, however, has not been successful in

organizing a federation-wide campaign in the unorganized areas of
employment.

This perhaps is due to the traditional AFL philosophy

which causes leadership to abdicate responsibility to the national
unions,
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but some observers also have charged that the current fed

eration leadership is too old, too tired and too complacent to pro
vide the needed leadership.^
For these reasons, the writers who predict a crisis argue that
short-run spurts of membership growth such as have been common in the
past, and which have been the main source of secular advance, are not
as likely to take place in the future.
In addition to describing the lack of conditions which would
promote membership growth in the short run, these writers also place
considerable emphasis on secular changes in the characteristics of
employment which they assert are creating structural barriers to labor

•^ I b i d ., p. 54.
"^Shister, "The Outlook for Union Growth," p. 59; Blum, "Labor
at the Crossroads," p. 7.
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union growth and therefore further reduce the likelihood of union
e x p a n s i o n .

From their point of view, the decline in membership

after 1954, and the continuing decline in the proportion of nonagri
cultural employment which is organized, were indicative of a state of
crisis for the union movement.

Although they do not predict the

inexorable decline of organized labor, they argue that it will be an
uphill fight if advances are to be made, requiring a massive effort of
the unions and their leaders.

Thus, the period following 1954 could

well be the beginning of secular decline and not just another lull
between short-run spurts of growth.
The purpose of this dissertation is to provide empirical tests
of the effects on union membership of some of these secular changes in
the composition of employment.

Chapter III is devoted to a detailed

discussion of the employment changes and the arguments of those who
think the changes are important for union membership.

CO

-'•'Bernstein predicted that the long-run growth in the labor
force and employment would generate secular growth in union member
ship, and he did not consider the structural composition of employment
growth.

CHAPTER III

BARRIERS TO THE GROWTH OF ORGANIZED LABOR

As outlined in Chapter II, the labor movement in the United
States has experienced significant growth since the turn of the cen
tury.

Bernstein and Taft predict that the movement will continue to

grow in the long run as the labor force and employment expand.*- HowO

ever, other writers, whom Bernstein labeled the "saturationists,"
argue that unions have already organized the most readily organizable
segments of the labor force--male, blue-collar employees working for
the most part for large firms in the manufacturing, mining, construc
tion and transportation sectors in the larger urban centers of the
Northeast, East North Central, and far West regions.

The frontiers of

the labor movement are the sectors not so easily organized:

female

employees; white-collar and service workers; employees in wholesale
and retail trade, the service industries, government employment and
agriculture; employees in small firms and in small towns; and workers
in the South.

Furthermore,

it is argued that since employment in

these unorganized, and supposedly unorganizable,

employment sectors is

^Bernstein, "The Growth of American Unions," p. 318; and Taft,
"Is There a Crisis in the Labor Movement? No," pp. 11-15.
^Bernstein, "The Growth of American Unions, 1945-1960," Labor
History, II (Spring, 1961), 131. Bernstein refers specifically to
Daniel Bell and his article, "The Next American Labor Movement,"
Fortune. April, 1953, p. 204.
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growing faster than in the unionized sectors, the domain, of organized
labor is shrinking.

This chapter is devoted to an examination of the

alleged barriers to union membership growth.

The Changing Sectoral Concentration of Employment
Union membership in the United States is highly concentrated
in a few sectors.

In Table 3 the employment sectors are ranked accord

ing to the degree of union organization in 1958.
sectors (i.e.,

The most organized

those with above average organization ratios) were

Transportation, Contract Construction, Mining and Quarrying, Manufac
turing, Communications, and Public Utilities.

Furthermore, these were

the only sectors in which unionization had made substantial inroads.
Union members constituted 63.0 per cent of all employment in these
sectors in 1958.

These sectors employed 81.7 per cent of all union

members and 45.1 per cent of all workers in 1958.
By 1968, the aggregate membership ratio for these sectors had
fallen to 55.2 per cent.

Total union membership could increase sub

stantially just by increasing the degree of organization in those sec
tors which are the principal union domain.

In the long run, however,

this field of potential union members is shrinking relative to total
nonagricultural employment.

Total nonagricultural employment grew by

32.1 per cent between 1958 and 1968 while employment in these sectors „ •
increased by only 18.7 per cent.

Thus, even if the labor movement

could enlist all employees in the sectors where it has relative
strength, the ratio of union membership to total employment would

TABLE 3
THE SECTORAL COMPOSITION OF NONAGRICULTURAL EMPLOYMENT
AND UNION MEMBERSHIP:
1958-1968

Sectors

Membership
as a Per Cent
of Employment

Per Cent
Distribution
of Union
Membership

Per Cent
Distribution
of Employment

Per Cent Change:
1958-1968

1958

1968

1958

1968

1958

1968

Memb.

Emp.

108.2C

93.6

15.3

12.7

4.9

4.0

7.7

6.7

83.7

77.4

13.1

12.9

5.5

4.9

9.3

18.3

82.8

56.4

3.5

1.7

1.5

.9

45.0

- 19.3

Total Manufacturing

52.7

46.5

45.9

44.8

30.3

28.3

8.8

23.3

Communications

47.6

48.5

2.3

2.4

1.7

1.5

16.4

14.2

Public Utilities

42.4

49.6

1.5

1.6

1.2

1.0

25.1

7.1

63.0

55.2

81.7

76.2

45.1

40.5

4.0

18.7

Services

18.2

10.3

7.0

5.5

13.4

15.8

11.9

56.1

Government

13.2

18.2

5.9

10.9

15.4

17.6

108.2

51.1

—

6.9

4.3

4.1

—

24.9

--

4.1

11.1

13.6

—

61.3

Transportation
Contract
Construction
Mining and
Quarrying

(Sub-Total)

Federal

n.a.

49.4

State and Local

n.a.

8.8

-

-

TABLE 3— Continued

Sectors
*

Per Cent
Distribution
of Union
Membership

Membership
as a Per Cent
of Employment

Per Cent
Distribution
of Employment

Per Cent Change:
1958-1968

1958

1968

1958

1968

1958

1968

Memb.

Emp.

Trade
Finance, Insurance,
and Real Estate

7.9

9.9

4.8

7.1

21.1

21.0

63.4

31.0

4.1

1.5

.6

.3

5.0

5.0

- 51.9

34.3

(Sub-Total)

11.6

11.7

18.3

23.8

.54.9

59.5

45.2

43.1

Total: All Nonagricultural Sectors

34.8

29.4

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

11.5

32.1

Goods-Producing
Sectors3

58.4

51.2

62.6

59.5

37.3

34.1

5.9

20.9

Service Sectors^

20.7

18.1

37.4

40.5

62.7

65.9

20.9

38.7

aManufacturing; Mining and Quarrying; and Contract Construction.
transportation; Communications; Public Utilities; Trade; Finance, Insurance, and Real
Estate; Services; and Government.
cMembership estimate exceeds employment estimate.
Calculated from Table 7, pp. 92-93.

See Note e, Table 7, p. 93.

43

eventually decline with the decline of the proportion of national
employment found in these sectors.
To a large extent, the shift in employment concentration out
lined above is the result of the shift in emphasis in the U.S. economy
from goods production to services.

The nonagricultural goods-producing

sectors are Manufacturing, Construction, and Mining--all sectors with
above average organization ratios. Changing consumer demand, improved
technology and increased labor productivity have caused employment
growth in the goods-producing group to be less than that for the
aggregate service sectors--which includes Transportation; Communica
tions; Public Utilities; Trade; Finance, Insurance and Real Estate;
Services; and Government.

In 1968 the services sectors contained 65.9

per cent of all employees but only 40.5 per cent of all union members.
The fastest employment growth has occurred in Government, spe
cifically at the state and local levels; Services; Finance, Insurance,
and Real Estate; and wholesale and retail Trade.

In 1968 the sec- .

tors Government, Services, and Trade provided 59.5 per cent of all
jobs, but only 23.8 per cent of all the union members.

The ratio of

members to employment was consequently much lower than for the areas of
principal union strength.

In Services, only 10.3 per cent of all

employees were union members in 1968, down from 18.2 per cent in 1958.
Membership in Services actually declined during this period of rapid
employment growth.
1968.

The ratio in Trade had risen to 9.9 per cent by

The membership ratio among Government employees has risen

steadily since 1958, but in 1968 was still only 18.2 per cent for all
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levels of government combined.

However, the fastest growth in member

ship among all employment sectors during this period was in Government
and Trade, whether reckoned on the absolute or percentage change basis.
The low ratio for all levels of government combined conceals a
much higher ratio for federal government employment (49.4 per cent in
1968).

Wortman estimates that the organization rate among postal

3
employees is even higher--approximately 84 per cent in 1960-1961.
Organization among state and local government employees has been
advancing rapidly (up 44.6 per cent between 1964 and 1968),^ although
the level of organization is still low (only 8.8 per cent of employees
in 1968).

Nevertheless, the State, County and Municipal Employees

union has been one of the fastest growing unions in recent years.

It

is the largest of all the government employee unions and the fourteenth
largest union in the nation.
Both Bernstein and Shister have suggested reasons for recent
union success among government employees.

The factors are both

% a x S. Wortman, Jr., "Collective Bargaining Strategies and
Tactics in the Federal Civil Service," Labor Law Journal. XV, No. 7
(1964). Reprinted in Critical Issues in Labor, ed. by Max S. Wortman,
Jr. (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1969), p. 103.
^U.S., Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Direc
tory of National and International Labor Unions in the United States
1969. Bulletin No. 1665 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1970), pp. 69 and 93.
(Hereinafter cited as U.S. Department of Labor,
Directory of Unions 1969.)
5Ibid.
^Bernstein, "The Growth of American Unions, 1945-1960,"
pp. 151-52; and Shister, "The Direction of Unionism 1947-1967: Thrust
or Drift?" p. 583.
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institutional and market-based.

At the federal level, President Ken

nedy's Executive Order 10988 of 1962 changed the official stance of
management in federal employment from, at best, tolerance to encourage
ment of worker organizations.^

At the state and local levels union

membership among government employees has benefited by the shift of
some properties, especially in local transit, from private to public
ownership,® as well as by lagging salaries, the narrowing of historic
fringe-benefit differentials between private industry and government
employment, the growing variety in public employment, the unsatisfac
tory handling of grievances under civil service procedures, and state
legislative actions designed to encourage collective bargaining.

9

The employment and membership patterns may be summarized as
follows:

where unions have been historically strongest, the employ

ment base is not growing as rapidly as in other sectors, so that
future expansion of membership in those sectors is ultimately limited
to the below-average rate of growth of employment; where employment is
growing the fastest, unions have been historically weak.

The impor

tance of these employment shifts in the saturationist argument is
based on the assumption that where unions have failed to make headway

^Everett M. Kassalow, "White-collar Unionism in the United
States," in White-collar Trade Unions, ed. by Adolf Sturmthal (Urbana,
111.: University of Illinois Press, 1966), p. 335.
^Bernstein, "The Growth of American Unions, 1945-1960,"
pp. 151-52.
^Shister, "The Direction of Unionism 1947-1967:
Drift?'.' p. 583.
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in the past, they are doomed to fail again.

If unions remain weak in

the expanding sectors, it will be difficult for organized labor to
maintain its power and prestige.

However, the greatest gains in mem

bership since 1958 have been in the sectors where employment is grow
ing the fastest.
For the most part the saturationists explain the industrial
disparity in the degree of organization by resorting to other factors
discussed below, e.g., a high concentration of male, blue-collar
workers in the organized sectors and the greater proportion of female
and white-collar workers in the relatively unorganized sectors.

Thus,

for these writers, the unorganized sectors are likely to remain
unorganized because of the characteristics of employment in them.
For some writers, like Barkin, the employment shifts not only
threaten future growth but also help explain the decline in membership
which characterized the period following 1 9 5 4 . ^

Barkin said:

"The

major cause for attrition in union membership has been the shrinkage
of employment in the organized industries."^
that contention is intuitively plausible:

In at least one case

total employment in Mining

and Quarrying in 1968 was less than total union membership in that
sector in 1958, and membership attrition would seem a likely result.
It is questionable whether the employment shift is solely responsible
for the membership reduction which actually occurred, however, for the

*®Barkin, The Decline of the labor Movement, p. 10.
11Ibid.
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membership lost was far greater than the employment reduction in both
absolute and percentage terms.

Between 1958 and 1968 membership fell

by 280,000, or -45.0 per cent, while employment fell by 145,000 or
-19.3 per c e n t . ^
If union organization adapts to the shift away from the domi
nance of manufacturing, it will inevitably be accompanied by changes
in the union movement itself.
quences of such a shift.

13

Bernstein suggested several conse-

The balance of power within the movement

will be more reflective of the attitudes of workers in the burgeoning
membership areas, and labor leaders will probably reflect this shift
of power and base.

In addition, membership growth is likely to come

quietly, not like the manufacturing breakthrough of the thirties.
The most rapidly growing areas of union membership, Government employ
ment and Trade, have been characterized by rapid growth without major
strikes and with little public attention.

Difficulties in Extending Organization in Smaller Communities
To be sure the correlation between the extent of unionization
and city size is not perfect, but there are cogent reasons why,
ceteris paribus, organization is easier and less costly in large
cities than in small communities.

Shister emphasizes what he calls

the "proximity influence" whereby unionists serve to facilitate

12See Table 3.
^Bernstein, "The Growth of American Unions, 1945-1960,"
pp. 156-57.
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organization by serving as an example to the unorganized and also by
giving direct support to a local organizing campaign.^

Establishing

the first local in a community may be more costly in time and money
than the expansion to other shops in the vicinity.

It is easier to

spread unionism if the unorganized are concentrated in the same
locale, e.g., a metropolitan area, than if they are scattered among
smaller communities.
Barkin asserts that small town locals tend to be neglected by
the national office because they are usually isolated and small . ^
The benefits to union membership are not well demonstrated to poten
tial members,

in that case, and local officers may become less fer-

vant advocates of the cause.

Organization Difficulties in Small Firms
The labor editor of Fortune wrote in 1950 that though many
factors have contributed to the slow-down in union membership growth,
the important point is that most large manufacturing corporations are
unionized.^

It was argued there, and has been often repeated by

others, that organizing the smaller business unit is more difficult

•^Shister, "The Logic of Union Growth," pp. 422-24.

15
^Barkin, The Decline of the Labor Movement, p. 37. Note:
Barkin speaks with the authority of an insider, for he was Research
Director for the Textile Workers Union of America for twenty-five
years.
■^"Obstacles to Future Union Growth," Fortune. XLI (April,
1950), 51.,
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and far more costly for the union in view of the smaller number of
dues-payers to be g a i n e d . ^
Because of the low dues return in organizing separate small
units, unions have used short-cut techniques such as picketing, secon
dary boycotts, or the "hot cargo" provisions of collective agreements.
The techniques have been increasingly restricted by legislative, admin
istrative, and judicial sanctions.

For organization of these workers

to justify the cost in money terms, and for bargaining to be success
ful, the organization effort may need to be aimed at a larger target, »•
such as an entire industry or region.

That is a difficult undertak

ing, especially where there is no working relationship among employees
in different shops, or where firms are not close to each other in
location.
Bernstein took exception to the difficulty of organizing the
small shop.^®

He pointed out that the larger anti-union employer has

greater resources with which to combat an organization drive than a
small employer, and he cited evidence that most representation elec
tions won by unions have been in shops with less than 100 employees.

Organization Among Female Employees
Table 4 documents the rising share of total employment held by
female employees as well as the lower organization rate among them.

■^See, for instance, Barkin, The Decline of the Labor Move
ment. p. 38.
^Bernstein, "The Growth of American Unions, 1945-1960,"
pp. 150-51.

50

TABLE 4
UNION MEMBERSHIP AND NONAGRICULTURAL
EMPLOYMENT BY SEX:
1958-1968
1958

1968

(Per Cent)
Distribution of Union Membership®

Distribution of Nonagricultural
Employment^

Membership as a Percentage of
Employment0

Line
No.

Total
Female
Male

100.0
18.2
81.8

100.0
19.5
80.5

1
2
3

Total
Female
Ma le

100.0
34.2
65.8

100.0
37.7
62.3

4
5
6

Total
Female
Male

29.6
15.8
36.8

26.2
13.6
33.9

7
8
9

aU.S., Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics , Directory of National and International Labor Unions in the United States
1969, Bulletin 1665 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1970), p. 70. These data are based on estimates which include some
membership outside the U.S. (mostly in Canada).
It is assumed here
that the ratio of female to total membership is the same in the U.S.
as it is in the Canadian locals of these unions.
^U.S., Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Hand
book of Labor Statistics 1970. Bulletin 1666 (Washington, D.C.: Gov
ernment Printing Office, 1970), pp. 25-26.
These are census data
(which are a count of persons) instead of the payroll data (a count of
jobs) which is usually used in comparing employment and membership.
The payroll data do not provide the female component prior to 1964.
This substitution introduces a definite downward bias in the ratio of
membership to employment since the census data include larger estimates
of both total employment and female employment than the payroll data.
cLine 7 is total union membership in the U.S. (from Table 1)
as a percentage of census-data employment (Handbook of Labor Statistics
1970, p. 25). Line 8 is the product of line 2 and the quotient of
lines 7 and 5. Line 9 is the product of line 3 and quotient of lines
7 and 6 .
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In 1958 female employees constituted only 34.2 per cent of all nonagricultural employment.

That proportion rose steadily until by 1968

female employment was 37.7 per cent of the total.

At the same time,

the proportion of union members who are women rose from 18.2 per cent
in 1958 to 19.5 per cent in 1968.

The.rate of organization among

female employees is not as high as the rate among male employees.
Furthermore, the organization rate among employed women declined from
15.8 per cent in 1958 to 13.6 per cent in 1968 (indicating that female
employment increased more rapidly than female union membership), while
the organization rate among male employees began to rise after 1964.
The organization rate among all employees continued to decline after
1964, indicating the stronger influence of the rapid increase in
female employment relative to the increases in female and male
membership.
In spite of the more rapid growth of female membership, female
employees are much less unionized than male employees and are a
minority in organized labor.

In 1968, almost one-fourth of the

national unions reported having no women members; over half of the
unions were either all male or less than 10 per cent female; and women
were a majority in only thirty unions (16 per cent of all those
reporting).19
Barkin argued that the low degree of unionization among women
is attributable to attitudes toward employment and collective

l^U.S.

Department of Labor, Directory of Unions 1969. p. 70.
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bargaining that are less conducive to unionization than those held by
men.^®

Bernstein did not accept the differences in attitudes as an

explanation for the disparate organizational ratios for men and women.
He argued that, in the abstract, there is no basis for expecting difO I

ferent behavior in the sexes with regard to unionism. L

The

economic

and social forces which lead to a decision about unionization work on
both men and women employees.

Women can be as militant as men.

Bernstein explained the difference in degree of organization
of men and women by attributing it to the industrial and occupational
locus of most female employment.
The difference in the membership rate . . . is to be explained
largely by the fact that women work primarily in industries and
occupations into which unions have not made a deep penetration,
primarily office, sales, and services.
In these areas both sexes
are relatively unorganized.22
In 1969, over 80 per cent of all women in the experienced civilian
labor force were either white-collar workers or service workers.^3
(See The Low Organization Rate Among White-collar Workers, below.)
Female employment is highly concentrated in Trade, Services, and
Government,24 and Table 3 indicates that these same sectors are the
areas of lowest union organization.

According to Bernstein, women are

^Barkin, The Decline of the Labor Movement, pp. 40-41.
^Bernstein, "The Growth of American Unions, 1945-1960,"
pp. 150-51.

22

Ibid.

^U.S..

Department of Labor, Handbook 1970. p. 36.

24Ibid., p. 90.
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employed in those areas which are otherwise not well organized.

The

lack of organization is not attributable in any exceptional way to the
female employees.

Obviously,

these data are not proper evidence in

support of either hypothesis since they do not indicate which is cause
and which is effect:

Are the women less unionized because they work

in less unionized sectors, or are those sectors less organized because
of the prominence of women among their work forces?
The thesis that female employees are not attracted to collec
tive bargaining organizations is contradicted by the experience of
employee associations among some professional workers.

Of the profes

sional workers, the engineers, entertainers, airline pilots, editors
and reporters, nurses, and teachers are the most unionized.

The

largest of these organizations are those representing the nurses,
teachers, and entertainers.

Although the American Nurses Association

and the National Education Association are not unions in name, they
are "functional" unions by virtue of the fact that they engage in col
lective bargaining on behalf of their members.

The strength of these

organizations obviously rests on strong support from female employees
since women constitute such a large proportion of the work force in
these occupational groups.

The Low Organization Rate Among White-collar Workers
The overwhelming majority of union membership in the United
States is among blue-collar or manual workers.

According to Table 5,

the white-collar share of union membership is increasing slowly, but
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it was still only 15.7 per cent of total membership in 1968.

25

Leo

Troy estimated that service workers and agricultural workers make up
less than 1 per cent of total membership.

26

Although the overall organization rate of white-collar workers
is low there are some strong unions among white-collar employees,
e.g., among postal employees, railway clerks, retail clerks, musi
cians, actors, artists, airline pilots, and journalists.

The Retail

Clerks International Association was the eighth largest union in the
U.S. in 1968.

27

Some white-collar unions have been among the fastest

growing unions in recent years:

the Retail Clerks increased member

ship by approximately 60 per cent between 1960 and 1968; membership in
the American Federation of Government Employees more than quadrupled
and membership in the American Federation of Teachers tripled during
the same p e r i o d . T h e s e unions, with substantial white-collar mem
bership, were growing rapidly during a period when many of the unions
composed predominantly of blue-collar members were declining or stag
nant.

Nevertheless, membership among white-collar employees is only a

small fraction of the potential.

25

For corroborative evidence based on a different data source
see: Leo Troy, "Trade Union Growth in a Changing Economy," Monthly
Labor Review. XCII, No. 9 (1969), 5, Table 3.
26Ibid.
27
'U.S. Department of Labor, Directory of Unions 1969. p. 93.
2®Ibid.
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TABLE 5
UNION MEMBERSHIP AND EMPLOYMENT FOR WHITE-COLLAR
AND BLUE-COLLAR WORKERS:
1960-1968
'
Item

1960

1968
(Per Cent)

Distribution of Union Membership3
White-collar workers
Blue-collar workers
All occupations

12.2
87.9
100.0

15.7
84.3
100.0

Distribution of Employment^5
White-collar workers
Blue-collar workers
All occupations

43.1
36.3
100.0

46.8
36.3
100.0

8.9
76.0
31.4

9.4
64.8
27.9

Union Membership as a Percentage of
Employment for the Same Occupation Group
White-collar workers
Blue-collar workers
All occupations^

aU.S., Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Direc
tory of National and International Labor Unions in the United States,
1969, Bulletin 1665 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1970), p. 70. These estimates of distribution are for total member
ship, including some foreign members (mos tly Canadian). It is assumed
that the same proportion prevails among the purely U.S. membership as
for the total membership.
The blue-collar membership entry is a residual. This is justi
fied by the work of Leo Troy (see page 54, n. 25) which shows that less
than 1 per cent of union membership are service or agricultural workers.
^U.S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Statisti
cal Abstract of the United States. 91st edition (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 225. These estimates of distri
bution of employment among the major occupational groups are based on
payroll data. The data for 1958 are not available.
cThe estimate for white-collar workers is the product of total,
membership as a per cent of total employment (line 9) and the quotient
of white-collar membership as a per cent of total membership and
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TABLE 5— Continued

white-collar employment as a per cent of total employment (line 1
divided by line 4). The blue-collar figure is derived similarly.
^These figures are taken from Table 1 where employment is
also based on payroll data.
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Between 1960 and 1968 white-collar union membership grew by
44.9 per cent, while total white-collar employment grew by 23.8 per
cent.

The proportion of white-collar employees who are union members

rose from 7-6 to 8.9 per cent which is to be contrasted with the 63.4
per cent organization rate among blue-collar workers.
In contrast to the small share of union membership held by
white-collar employees, these workers are more numerous than bluecollar workers, and white-collar employment grew almost twice as
rapidly as blue-collar employment between 1960 and 1968.

The more

rapid growth of employment among white-collar workers is attributable
both to technological progress and the changing composition of the
nation's output.

Kassalow noted that manufacturing output nearly

doubled in the United States between 1947 and 1963, while the number
of manual employees in manufacturing declined and white-collar employOQ

ment in manufacturing rose substantially.
The factors which have been suggested as determinants of

*

unionization among white-collar workers fall into three categories:
(1) the technological and market features of white-collar employment,
which in turn contribute to (2) the subjective attitude of whitecollar workers toward unionism, and (3) the position of organized
labor with respect to extending membership among white-collar workers.

29

Everett M. Kassalow, "Unionization of White-collar Workers,"
in Labor in a Changing America, ed. by William Haber (New York: Basic
Books, Inc., 1966), p. 160.
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Kassalow argues that white-collar work has traditionally been
less toilsome or onerous than blue-collar work and thus relatively
less conducive to the stimulation of worker protest.

30

In addition to

less harsh physical working conditions he cites the easier work pace,
less time-clock pressure, and work assignments that are both more
interesting and more varied.31

Furthermore, white-collar workers were

granted fringe benefits, such as paid vacations and holidays, before
blue-collar workers, and white-collar workers have been less subject
to layoffs.32
Several factors are cited as contributing to the alleged
white-collar antipathy towards unionism.

Kassalow argues that because

of their proximity to management white-collar workers are more likely
to identify with management.33

In addition, white-collar workers tend

to be primarily and predominantly means-minded instead of concerned
only with ends, according to Burns, which conflicts with the mode of
operation of the typical union:

where pressures are stressed more

than procedures and skills, where ends carry more weight than the
means used to attain them, and where attention is focused on the

on

Kassalow, "White-collar Unionism in the United States,"
pp. 355-56.
31

Ibid.

32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
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welfare of the group instead of on the individual in the g r o u p . ^
Kassalow adds that white-collar workers tend to be more conservative
in their political views and in their consideration of social pro
grams. ^

Since unionism has been a predominantly blue-collar movement

in the United States, white-collar workers are apt to look upon the
union as a blue-collar institution.
Barkin insisted that the traditional business-unionism with
its emphasis on "more, now" is not sufficient to attract most whitecollar workers.

A broader vision than that of simply getting more

money from the employer is needed.

This is especially true for the

professional employees.
The collegiate or comparable training required for most pro
fessions has molded a keen identity among the occupational group,
with specific responsibilities frequently formulated into codes of
professional conduct. While these codes were designed primarily
to fit the needs of the independent practitioner, they' have also
been considered binding on professional employees. This attitude
gave greater weight to professional or public obligations than to
personal self-interest. To the independent practitioner, the
client— whether patient, pupil, litigant, audience, or the general
public— has highest priority, at least in theory. Economic selfinterest must thus be advanced by raising qualifications and
instituting systems of certification.36
This raises the question of whether professionalism is com
patible with collective bargaining.

The National Society of

Robert K. Burns, "Unionization of the White-collar Worker,"
in Readings in Labor Economics and Industrial Relations, ed. by Joseph
Shister (Chicago: 'J. B. Lippincott Co., 1951), p. 65.
^Kassalow, "White-collar Unionism in the United States,"
p. 362.
^Barkin, The Decline of the Labor Movement, pp. 46-47.
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Professional Engineers is on record, according .to Barkin, with the
unequivocal statement, "Professionalism and unionism are
incompatible."*^?
(

Finally, Kassalow asserts that the large female contingent
among white-collar workers acts to inhibit unionization both because
female workers are less prone to join unions and because male whitecollar employees find career advancement easier due to the more rapid
OQ
turnover among female employees. °
Finally, it is argued that if substantial progress is to be
made in organizing white-collar workers, it will necessitate a mas
sive, coordinated, federation-level effort by the unions as well as
innovative changes in organizing techniques.^

Traditional AFL-CIO

philosophy assigns the responsibility for organizing to the national
unions.

Kassalow states that union leaders are not in agreement that

such a drive is justified, and that they are preoccupied with other
administrative problems.^®
Kassalow argues that some of these factors are changing in
ways that may enhance unionization.

The automation of office work,

through mechanization and electronic data processing, has a disruptive
effect on office organization and jobs, leaving clerical workers with

^ Ibid.. p. 38.
^®Kassalow, "White-collar Unionism in the United States,"
p. 356.
Shister, "The Outlook for Union Growth," p. 59.
^^Kassalow, "Unionization of White-collar Workers, pp. 164-65.“
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less interesting, more repetitive work and with less unstructured time
to socialize while on the j o b . ^

Furthermore, office automation may

reduce the upward mobility of some white-collar workers.

Whereas for

merly the white-collar worker could hope to advance by degrees into
more desirable jobs, automation creates a polarization of low-grade
and high-grade jobs with little intermediate ground.^
According to Kassalow, the traditionally assumed personal
relationship between the clerical or professional employee and the
employer is less realistic when large armies of these workers perform
routinized tasks.

As described by Barkin, both blue-collar and white-

collar workers are now
. . . often huddled together in large organizations, pushed around
by the same type of impersonal management, and subject to the whims
and personal prejudices, the likes and dislikes, of supervision
and faceless pressures characteristic of large-scale operations.4-3
Furthermore, management may become less inclined to regard this work
force as a fixed expense and more inclined to institute the layoff dur
ing periods of light work load s . ^

Kassalow, "White-collar Unionism in the United States,"
pp. 356-57. Kassalow cites a study by Ida R. Hoos, "When the Computer
Takes Over the Office," Harvard Business Review (July-August, 1960),
pp. 102-12.
^Kassalow, "White-collar Unionism in the United States."
Kassalow cites a study by Claudine Marenco, "Psychosociological
Incidences of Office Work Rationalization of Employee Status," which
appeared in Trade Union Information, No. 35 (1962), published by the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Paris, France.
^Barkin, The Decline of the Labor Movement, p. 44.
^Kassalow, "White-collar Unionism in the United States,"

p. 358.
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According to Kassalow, professional workers may decide that
collective bargaining is necessary to protect the professional stan
dards which they set themselves.

This need would arise when manage

ment alters the job description to include menial or sub-professional
tasks, e.g., bus-patrol and cafeteria-watch for teachers or general
housekeeping duties for nurses, and when management does violence to
professional standards in an effort to reduce costs or to cater to
,
45
popular tastes.
Shister argues that the changing nature of white-collar
employment is not a sufficient stimulus to induce unionization.

He

cites the working conditions of engineers in the large aerospace firms.
These conditions fit Barkin's description and have existed since World
War II without resulting in any appreciable unionization of these
w o rkers.^

Kassalow admits that if the expanding white-collar work

force comes from the blue-collar ranks or from blue-collar families,
the deteriorating white-collar working conditions may be seen as an
improvement over blue-collar working conditions and thus not induce
worker discontent . ^

^~*Ibid.. p. 354.
Shister, "The Direction of Unionism 1947-1967:
Drift?" p. 582.

Thrust or

^Kassalow, "White-collar Unionism in the United States,"
p. 359.
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The Low Organization Ratio in the South
As shown in Table 6, the majority of union members in the
United States are located in the East and East North Central states.
In 1968, 47.7 per cent of all nonagricultural payrolls were found in
those states, but they contained 56.9 per cent of all union membership.
Only 12.9 per cent of payrolls were located in the Pacific region
(excluding Alaska and Hawaii), but 14.9 per cent of union members were
found there.
these regions:

Thus, union membership is relatively concentrated in
the East, which includes New England and the Middle

Atlantic; the East North Central; and the Pacific.

The South, on the

other hand has a much larger share of employment than the Pacific
region but a smaller share of union membership.

Southern employment

grew at more than twice the rate of employment in the East and East
North Central, where the bulk of union membership is located.

Despite

several organizational campaigns aimed at Southern employment, how*
ever, Southern unionization remains less strong than that in other
regions.

The organization rate is lower for the South than for other

regions, as indicated in Table 6 , and the Southern states are concen
trated at the bottom of the list of all states when ranked according
to organization ratios.^®
Ray Marshall has warned against regarding the South as uni
formly low in its degree of organization.

Kentucky is an exception to

the rule of low organization ratios for it ranks 20th nationally in

^®U.S. Department of Labor, Directory of Unions 1969. p. 76.

TABLE 6
UNION MEMBERSHIP AND NONAGRICULTURAL EMPLOYMENT
FOR SELECTED REGIONS : 1958 AND 1968

Item and Regions

1958

1968
(Per Cent)

Distribution of Union Membership
East and East North Central
South
Pacific
All Regions

100.0

56.9
13.3
14.9
100.0

Distribution of Nonagricultural Employment
East and East North Central
South
Pacific
All Regions

51.0
22.5
11.2
100.0

47.7
24.4
12.9
100.0

33.2

33.8
15.5
32.9
27.9

Membership as a Percentage of Employment
East and East North Central
South
Pacific
All Regions
Percentage Change in Employment
East and East North Central
South
Pacific
All Regions

Sources:

1958-1968
23.4
43.4
51.9
32.1

Membership data are calculated from U.S., Department of
Labor Statistics, Directory of National and International
Labor Unions in the United States, 1969, Bulletin 1665
(Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 76.
Employment data are calculated from U.S., Department of
Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Handbook of Labor Statis
tics 1970, Bulletin 1666 (Washington, D.C.:
Government
Printing Office, 1970), p. 94.

65

total membership and 18th in ratio of membership to employment.

An

Kentucky has a higher organization ratio than Massachusetts which is
the state with the tenth largest total membership in the nation.

Like

wise, some Southern cities are more unionized than some industrial
cities outside the South.

In 1952, Louisville and Richmond ranked

ahead of Scranton and Denver in the ratio of membership to employment
in manufacturing, while Memphis and Norfolk-Portsmouth ranked ahead of
those and also ahead of Boston, Cincinnati and Hartford."*®

Some

employment sectors are more unionized in the South than in the nonSouth, e.g., primary metals, products of petroleum and coal, transpor
tation equipment, paper and allied products, and tobacco products.-**•
In spite of these exceptions, however, organized labor has
made less progress in the South than in the non-South.

In most employ

ment sectors the South is less organized than the national average.
Leo Troy calculated that had the Southern portion of each industry
been as well organized as that industry was nationwide, then membership

-*®Ray Marshall, "Some Factors Influencing the Growth of Unions
in the South," Proceedings of the Thirteenth Annual Meeting, Indus
trial Relations Research Association (Madison, Wis.:
Industrial Rela
tions Research Association, 1961), p. 169.
-^Ray Marshall, "Ethnic and Economic Minorities: Unions'
Future or Unrecruitable?" in The Crisis in the American Trade-Union
Movement. ed. b y >Solomon Barkin and Albert A. Blum, The Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science, CCCL (Philadelphia:
November, 1963), p. 69.
(Hereinafter cited as "Ethnic and Economic
Minorities.")
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in the South would have been almost 75 per cent higher than it actu
ally was in 1953.-^
Although incomes are low in the South, they are rising; and
the low level from which they started seems to make the gains just
that much more impressive.

Therefore, part of the usual appeal by

unions has been blunted by these improving conditions in Southern
employment.

Furthermore, factory wages are higher than the income of

the marginal share-cropper; and the surplus of labor on the farms
reminds the factory worker that he can be replaced, for there are
potential strike-breakers ready to cross picket lines.
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Some of the religious sects which have enjoyed minor popularity
in the South have preached a kind of fatalism that subverts the effort
to change personal economic conditions in this world, rather like the
medieval Catholic Church.

Pacifist groups have also enjoyed some

popularity in the South, and these abhor all conflict, whether it be
war or strikes.

On the other hand, the Southern Baptist Conventioh

and the Catholic Church have both publicly endorsed and encouraged
unionization.-^
The agrarian background of most Southern workers has been
important in shaping their attitudes toward unionism as a means of

"^Leo Troy, "The Growth of Union Membership in the South,
1939-1953," The Southern Economic Journal. XXIV, No. 4 (1958), 420.
-*%arshall, "Some Factors Influencing the Growth of Unions in
the South," p. 175.
54 Ibid.. p. 177.
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improving their circumstances of employment.
an individualistic approach to problems.

This background fosters

Southern workers often view

the control of the conditions of employment as the natural right of
the e m p l o y e r . T h e r e f o r e ,

they accept conditions and do not show the

discontent usually necessary for successful organizing.
The civil rights question is a serious problem facing unions.
A distinction should be made between the effects of the civil rights
movement on potential Negro union members and its effect on white
employees.

Racial problems have encumbered Southern unions since the

Civil War, and they became particularly acute following the 1954
school-desegregation decision of the U.S. Supreme Court . ^

In order

to avoid the stigma of discrimination outside the South the unions
adopted an anti-segregation policy position.

Some Southern employers

capitalized on this to defeat organizing campaigns among Southern
whites.It

is not possible to offer conclusive proof, however, that

these tactics have significantly forestalled unionization where it*
would have otherwise occurred.

Marshall wrote that when workers feel

a union is justified on economic grounds, they are not dissuaded by
racial arguments.

55Ibid., p. 174.
■^Marshall, "Ethnic and Economic Minorities," p. 71.
57Ibid.
58Ibid.
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(
Marshall surveyed the history of relations between unions and
the civil rights movement and concluded that an uneasy alliance has
CQ

been maintained.

The lack of effective machinery to enforce the

anti-segregation policy of the AFL-CIO persuaded Negroes that the
problem received low priority among the unions.

However, Marshall

contends that Negro leaders realize that the unions are an important
instrumentality in the attainment of their overall goals of economic
and political equality.

The desertion of existing unions or creation

of Negro unions would not suit their needs as well as would the
improvement of the existing movement.
ments have not been destroyed,

Negro-labor political align

for unions still support civil rights

legislation and. Negroes still oppose right-to-work laws.**®
The power which Southern employers wield in the local commu
nity may inhibit unionization.

Assurances to workers that they cannot

be fired for union activity carry little weight with them when they
believe the employer can do what he wishes and get away with it.
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Even should the employer be brought to task for unfair labor practice
in discharging a union sympathizer or shifting production to other,
nonstriking plants, retributive justice is slow to be realized while
the economic impact on the worker is immediate.

Such coercion is

59Ibid.. pp. 64-67.
^9Ibid.. p. 68 .
^Marshall, "Some Factors Influencing the Growth of Unions in
the South," pp. 175-76.
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difficult to prove, and it takes a lengthy investigation to substan
tiate a case for the hearing.
In many communities, especially the smaller ones, the employers
have such influence in local affairs that they can align the local law
enforcement officers, religious leaders, news media, and politicians
against the union.
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Leo Troy wrote that, although experience dif

fers within the region, the labor injunction has been used effectively
to thwart organizing in the South.

In the absence of comprehensive

stage legislation courts of local jurisdiction have formulated government labor policy in the area.

go

Southern politicians and newspaper

editors have placed a great deal of faith in industrialization as the
key to economic development of the S o u t h . ^

If they feel that unions

threaten that progress by slowing production gains, or by repulsing
potential (anti-union) industrial employers, they attack the unions
with all their power, which may be considerable at the local level.
Employers in the relatively competitive, high-labor-cost
industries are likely to resist unions with special firmness.

For

example, the textile firms are highly competitive, with small profit
margins, and tightly controlled wages.

Collective bargaining has *

limited potential in securing income improvements in such cases.
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Barkin, The Decline of the Labor Movement, pp. 30-31.

^Troy, "The Growth of Union Membership in the South, 19391953," p. 417.
^Marshall, "Some Factors Influencing the Growth of Unions in
the South," p. 180.
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Marshall argued that employment in the South is relatively concen
trated in such industries, and that this is therefore one explanation
for the low incidence of membership in the area.*’-*
Employers may also be a positive force in union organizing,
whether intentionally or not.

Many of the new plants in the South are

branches of firms with unionized plants in other parts of the country.
Even if the employer in such a case is not especially desirous of hav
ing a union in the new plant he may support the organization drive of
the union with which he deals in his older plants on the basis that it
is easiest to deal with the fewest number of unions possible.

Also,

if he should refuse to countenance organization of his new plant, he
may be faced with a strike at his older plants.
It is also possible that the union can perform a useful func
tion for the employer, and so the employer might not oppose organiza
tion for this reason.

Marshall suggested several examples:

the

.

regulation of competition, as in coal mining and electrical construc
tion; the supply of skilled manpower at a contractual wage, as in con
tract construction and with longshoremen; the insurance of employment
continuity, as with public utilities and the newspapers; .the use of
(

the union label, as with garments, the breweries, tobacco, and the
printing trades; and the provision of a grievance mechanism in all.
industries

^Marshall, "Ethnic and Economic Minorities," p. 69.
Ibid.. p. 70.
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Opinion differs as to the effectiveness of the right-to-work
laws in limiting organization.

Such laws exist in all Southern states

except Oklahoma, Kentucky, and Louisiana.
laws " . . .

Barkin wrote that these

are a serious impediment to new organizational gains.

This conclusion is supported by the relatively lower ratio of union
election victories in the right-to-work states."^

Marshall, on the

other hand, suggested that these laws
. . . are probably designed mainly to (advertise the states' hos
tility to unions and not to guarantee the right to work. These
laws apparently have not had much influence on union organizing,
but have a great symbolic significance. Labor leaders note that
Louisiana judges and other governmental officials took a more
favorable attitude toward unions when the latter demonstrated
their political power by obtaining the repeal of the Louisiana
"Right-to-Work" law in 1956. By the same token, unions in other
states find officials more hostile to them because their polit
ical weakness is symbolized by their inability to repeal these
laws.
Frederic Meyers has studied these laws and feels that they have h$d
only minimal direct effect, and that in marginal situations only.
Organization in the South is easier when the organizing union
has a strong membership base outside the South to provide financial
support and more experienced or better trained leaders.

The unions

which are strongest in the South are strong nationally, e.g., those

^Barkin, The Decline of the Labor Movement, p. 24.
^^Marshall, "Some Factors Influencing the Growth of Unions in
the South," p. 180.
6% r e d e r i c Meyers, The Right to Work in Practice (New York:
The Fund for the Republic, 1959), p. 46.
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in steel, autos, rubber, coal, pulp, and p a p e r . ^

The textile indus

try, based largely in the South, has no large Northern base to support
a Southern organizing campaign, and its organization ratio is low.
Unorganized employment in the South is scattered in small
towns.

The lack of geographic concentration of employees makes it

more expensive for the unions.

Their resources must be spread more

thinly, and they can count on very few volunteer organizers.
eral, the unorganized workers are in smaller plants.

In gen

All of this

means that the organizing cost per new member is higher.

A concerted

campaign at the federation level might be able to finance a widespread
attack; but, so far, jurisdictional disputes among the affiliated
unions, and the federation philosophy of decentralized power which
precludes federation-led organization drives, have either thwarted
altogether or limited the effectiveness of united campaigns.7*-

Assessing the Theories of Union Membership Growth
There seems to be little argument with the Dunlop-Bernstein
explanation of the spurts of membership growth that have occurred in
the past.

Their analysis of the influences of war and social unrest

is well documented and apparently accepted by other students of the
subject.

This analysis dealt only with depression-born unrest, but

the breadth of the term "social unrest" may easily encompass other

^Marshall, "Ethnic and Economic Minorities," p. 70.
71Ibid.
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engines of unrest, such as rapid inflation or misalignment of national
priorities.
However, there is less unanimity about the likelihood of future
periods of rapid growth.

The proponents of the saturationist theories

argue that spontaneous self-organization, which was important in the
past, is not as likely to occur among the groups which remain to be
organized by the unions.

These writers argue that the Southern

workers, the white-collar and service workers, the female employees,
the workers in the service-producing industrial sectors, and the
workers in the small firm and in the small town are naturally less
prone to be union members

They argue that the relative shift of

employment into these same, alien sectors is responsible for the
decline in real membership observed since 1954.
Nor do these writers expect an effective organization campaign
on the part of the unions to substitute for the disappearance of spon
taneous organization.

Either the unions will not be innovative enough

to meet the challenge, or the unions will not be convinced that the
reward is worth the effort.

The latter is likely to be the case when

the leaders of unions have limited, business-unionism goals, or when
the cost per-member-gained is relatively high, as in the case of
organizing small firms and firms in small towns.
Those who take a different view argue that, whether or not
these categories of workers, have been less amenable to organization in
the past, the conditions of their employment are already changing in
such a way that they may more easily be converted to unionism in the
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future.

On this premise Marshall, Kassalow, and Bernstein attack the

long-run inevitability of these structural barriers to organization
success.
Published empirical tests of the theories recited in this chap
ter are not numerous.

Several writers have cited data to support

their arguments, but rarely have the data been subjected to tests to
substantiate the significance of the data.
above:

Two exceptions were noted

Bernstein's test for the correlation between union membership

and the short-run movements of the business cycle, and Troy's demon
stration that the low incidence of union membership in the South in
1939 and 1953 was not entirely attributable to the unfavorable indus
trial mix of Southern employment.
The next chapter outlines a technique for comparing the growth
performance of different-sized units, and it contains an explanation
of the tests which can be applied to the membership and employmentcharacteristics data in order to assess the reliability of conclusions
drawn from their comparison.

Next, Chapter V contains the description

and results of tests of the arguments that the relative shifts in the
composition of employment have been responsible for the slow growth of
union membership in recent years.

CHAPTER IV

A PROPOSAL FOR TESTING SOME OF THE EXPLANATIONS
OF MEMBERSHIP GROWTH

The preceding chapters discussed several explanations of union
membership growth with emphasis on what Bernstein called the "saturationist" arguments.*- The next chapter assesses some of those explana
tions by examining the strength of organized labor and the
characteristics of employment on an industry-by-industry basis.

The

present chapter contains a description of the test methods employed in
the next chapter.
If the barriers described by the saturationist arguments are
effective constraints on union membership growth, we should expect to
find a significant correlation between the presence of these barriers
in the various employment sectors and the growth experience of union
membership in those sectors.

In order to test the effectiveness of

those alleged barriers, the growth of membership in each employment
sector will be compared with changes in some of the characteristics of
employment in the sectors.

Those sectors with the greatest relative

Those arguments may be summarized in this way:
the most
readily organ:* zable segments of the labor force have already been
organized, leaving the female, nonproduction workers in small firms,
in small towns, in the South, and in the service-producing sectors of
the economy. Furthermore, these less easily organized groups are in
the ascendency as a proportion of total employment.
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increase in employees who are supposedly difficult to organize should
be found to be the sectors with the relatively least growth in union
membership if the barriers are indeed effective constraints on member
ship growth.

The calculation of the coefficient of rank-order correla

tion may be used as a test of the correlation between those constraints
and below average membership growth.

The Data Used

Sources
The data used are nonagricultural union membership and employ
ment in selected employment sectors as well as the production-worker
and Southern components of employment in those sectors.

All employ

ment data, including the production-worker and Southern components,
are taken from Employment and Earnings:

United States. 1909-70

o

and

the companion bulletin, Employment and Earnings, States and Areas,
1939-69.

These data are derived from a large sample of payroll infor

mation supplied by employers and as such they are a count of jobs and
not of persons.

The data were grouped for this study into the follow

ing broad sectors:

Manufacturing; Mining and Quarrying; Contract

Construction; Transportation; Communications; Public Utilities; Trade

^U.S., Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics,
Employment and Earnings, United States, 1909-70, Bulletin 1312-7 *
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970), passim. .
JU.S., Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics
Employment and Earnings. States and Areas, 1939-69, Bulletin 1370-7
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970), passim.
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(wholesale and retail); Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate; Services;
and Government.

The Manufacturing group is further subdivided into a

frequently used classification comprising eight sectors, each composed
of from one to five two-digit, Standard Industrial Classification
sectors:
Manufacturing
Food and Tobacco
Food and Kindred Products
Tobacco Manufactures
Clothing
Textile Mill Products
Apparel
Leather Goods
Wood Products
Lumber and Wood Products
Furniture and Fixtures
Paper and Allied Products
Printing and Publishing
Chemicals, Petroleum, and Rubber
Chemicals
Petroleum and Coal Products
Rubber and Plastics
Stone, Clay, and Glass Products
Metals and Machinery
Primary Metals
Fabricated Metals
Machinery, Except Electrical
Electrical Equipment
Instruments and Related Products
Transportation Equipment

SIC Code
20
21
22
23
31
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
32
33
34
35
36
38
37

Two of the two-digit Manufacturing sectors are omitted from
this classification--Ordnance and Accessories (SIC Code 19) and
Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries (SIC Code 39)--because the dis
tribution of membership is unclear with respect to these two sectors
(see below).
The union membership data are taken from the estimates pro
vided by the Directory of National and International Labor Unions in
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the United States which is published biennially by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics.^

The biennial series is summarized in the,Handbook of

Labor Statistics 1970.

These membership estimates are primarily the

result of questionnaires sent out by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Respondents were first asked to estimate the distribution of member
ship among employment sectors in 1956, but it was not until the 1958
survey that the list of employment sectors was expanded to include
details for the manufacturing sector.

The list of employment sectors

used in the questionnaire is the same as that outlined above, except
that two "residual sectors" (Manufacturing--not included elsewhere and
Nonmanufacturing--not included elsewhere) are included for those mem
bers whose employment cannot be assigned with certainty by the offi
cial filling out the questionnaire.

These two sectors are omitted

from the test data because of the indeterminancy they represent.

Deficiencies of the Data
The employment data are both more comprehensive and more
detailed than the membership data.

However, the employment data

limit the selection of sectors for comparing production worker

^U.S., Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Direc
tory of National and International Labor Unions in the United States
(Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, published in even
years).
■hj.S., Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Hand
book of Labor Statistics 1970, Bulletin 1666 (Washington, D.C.: Gov
ernment Printing Office, 1970), pp. 335-37.
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employment and union membership.

The definition of production worker

employment used by the Bureau is not the salaried distinction fre
quently applied to differentiate blue-collar and white-collar workers
in manufacturing.

Production worker employment, as defined by the

Bureau, includes production workers in Mining and Manufacturing; con
struction workers in Contract Construction; and nonsupervisory workers
in Trade, Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate, Transportation, Commug
nications, Public Utilities, and Services.
For this reason, the
analysis of white-collar membership and employment will be restricted
to the Manufacturing, Mining, and Construction sectors where the
Bureau's definition of nonproduction worker is more nearly synonymous
with the term non-blue-collar worker.
The membership data are subject to further limitation.

The

distribution of membership among sectors is based on total membership
including members outside the United States.^

There is no way to

segregate these foreign members by industry for the sectoral classifi
cation desired in this study.

Moreover, single-firm or local unions

are excluded from the totals even when they are affiliated directly
with the AFL-CIO.8

6Ibid.. p. 70, n. 1 .
^These members reside mostly in Canada, but some are also in
Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands and the Canal Zone. The total foreign
membership in 1968 was estimated to be 1,436,000, or 7.1 per cent of
total reported members.
See, U.S. Department of Labor, Directory of
Unions 1969, p . 64.
Q

This was an omission of 523,000 members in 1968.
Department of Labor, Directory of Unions 1969. p. 65.

See, U.S.
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More fundamental objections to the Bureau figures are raised
Q
by several writers.

The reporting union official is asked to enter

the annual average number of dues-paying members.

The payment of dues,

is used as a gauge of the active, participating membership, and this
concept is commonly accepted.

However, the precision and consistency

of the membership figures provided by the unions is questioned.
potential sources of error have been suggested.

Many

Definitions of mem

bership vary among unions, with payment of dues being only one of sev
eral criteria for distinguishing members from nonmember "associates."
Persons considered to be in "good standing" but who pay no dues or
only part of the usual annual payment are often included in the esti
mates sent to the Bureau.

Seasonal employees who pay dues only part

of the year may be included as may be members who are sick or unemployed
or on strike.

Frequently reported, but not paying dues in full, are

those promoted out of the bargaining unit during the year, life mem
bers, workers recently organized, members of locals in economic diffi
culty, apprentices, members in the armed forces, and sometimes those
members who have retired.

Some of these reported "members" falsely

inflate the union's strength and should be omitted.

In addition, some

^See Leo Troy, "Trade Union Membership, 1897-1962," Review of
Economics and Statistics, February, 1965, pp. 93-113; and C. E. Fergu
son and W. J. Stober, "Estimates of Union Membership from Reports Filed
Under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act," The Southern
Economic Journal. XXXIII (October, 1966), 166-86; as well as the U.S.
Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Directory of National
and International Labor Unions in the United States. 1963, Bulletin
1395 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1964), pp. 53-55.
(Hereinafter cited as U.S. Department of Labor, Directory of Unions
1963.)
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unions may deliberately inflate membership figures, e.g., to enhance
their voting strength at federation conventions, or some may deflate
the estimates to lower their per capita dues obligation.^

Some unions

may report employees represented as members when only a portion of the
employees working under conditions bargained for by the union are
actually members.

For these reasons, it has been suggested that the

annual financial reports filed by unions in accordance with the LaborManagement Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 be used to obtain the
memberships of reporting u n i o n s . ^

Dues collections must be included

in these reports and division of this total by the annual dues rate
should yield reliable estimates of average dues-paying membership dur
ing the year.
However, some of the inconsistencies reported above represent
persons who do provide some of the unions' strength, e.g., strikers
and the sick, and the Bureau argues that the division of annual dues
collections by the annual dues rate, by failing to account for these
members, would also be a misleading figure.

12

Therefore, the Bureau

continues to rely on the questionnaire response from union headquarters.
This study uses the Bureau estimates because they contain the latest
and most refined data.

■^See Ferguson and Stober, "Estimates of Union Membership from
Reports Filed Under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act,"
pp. 184-85.
11Ibid., pp. 166-67,
12

182-86.

U.S. Department of Labor, Directory of Unions 1963. pp. 54-

55.
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The questionnaire itself contains the possibility of error.
After estimating the total membership the unions are asked to estimate
the approximate percentages of membership employed in the listed
employment sectors.

The frequency of round numbers such as "80 per

cent" suggests that in many cases the estimated distribution may be
only a crude guess.

These groups are not defined in terms of the

Standard Industrial Classification code, although they are based on
it.

Thus, for instance, a union with members in the ordnance industry

will not find that industry listed and must decide for itself whether
to place those members in Metals, Machinery and Equipment or Manufacturing— Not Included Elsewhere.

13

Because of this uncertainty both

Manufacturing--Not Included Elsewhere and Nonirianufacturing--Not
Included Elsewhere are excluded from the test data.
Finally, where a union fails

to report its membership or to

estimate the composition of its membership by sex, occupation, etc.,
the Bureau supplies its own estimates based on other sources of infor
mation.

The Shift-Share Technique
The shift-share technique was developed to compare relative
growth

in regional economic studies.

The apparent originator was

Daniel Creamer in a study for the U.S. National Resources Planning

13
Beginning with the 1969 survey, the questionnaire uses twodigit standard industrial classifications. However, the classifica
tion given in the text applies to the data used in the tests in Chapter
V.
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Board in 1943.

1/

Major impetus to its use was given by Perloff, Dunn,

and others in a large work entitled Regions, Resources and Economic
Growth which was published in 1960.

1s

An understanding of the use of shift-share analysis begins
with the definition of a "share."

In the context of this study, the

labor movement claims a proportion of all employment--its share of
national employment, or its share of employment in a particular sector.
This datum, the percentage of those employed who are unionists, is
often cited as a measure of the strength of organized labor, and it is
identical to the real membership measurement discussed in Chapter II.
If employment and membership grow at the same rate, the share
will be maintained, but if employment grows more rapidly than member
ship the share will decline.

The difference between actual membership

and the hypothetical membership that would just maintain the union
share of employment is called the net shift in union membership (Sn ,
where the superscript n indicates "net").

The shift will be positive,

negative, or zero as the membership share increases, decreases or
remains the same.

Although the share is expressed as a percentage or

proportion, the shift in the share is a cardinal number of workers.

Daniel Creamer, "Shifts of Manufacturing Industries," Indus
trial Location and National Resources, U.S. National Resources Plan
ning Board (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1943).
15

H. S. Perloff, E. S. Dunn, E. E. Lampard, ,and R. F. Muth,
Regions, Resources and Economic Growth (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
Press, 1960).

84

Let Ejk represent persons employed, where the subscript
j = 1, 2 , . . . m indicates the employment sector, the subscript
k = 1, 2 indicates union members and nonmembers respectively, and a
period subscript (.) always indicates a subscript summed.
is union membership in sector two, and E^

Thus, %2l

is total employment (mem

bers plus nonmembers) in sector number one.

Let an asterisk (*) indi

cate terminal year data and its absence indicate base year data.
*

E ^

Then

- E ^ is the total, absolute change in membership for ali sectors.
The share of national employment held by organized labor is

the ratio

ill
E

For the base year share of employment to be main-

tained in the terminal year requires that membership grow at the same
rate as employment,

i.e., that actual, terminal year employment be

equal to the hypothetical membership

rE * i
E

.

The national net

shift is the difference between the actual terminal year membership
and the hypothetical membership:

s“ = E. i

d)

n
where, for the constant-share case, S is zero.
•

n
If S is not zero,
•

there is a shift in the share of employment held by organized labor,and that shift, positive or negative, is given by the difference
between actual membership and the membership that would just maintain
the share.

This shift is called the net shift since it can be thought

of as the net result of two constituent shifts described below, and
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it is the national net shift because all sectors are included (the
subscripted period represents the sum of all j sectors).
The share of national employment held by unionists in an indi
vidual sector is the product of two contributing ratios:

the propor

tion of national employment located in that sector, and the proportion
of that sector's employment which is organized.

=
E••

Symbolically,

Ih.

E Jj • E • •

A shift in the share represented on the left side of the equality (the
net shift) can be decomposed into a shift in the intensity of organi
zation in the sector and/or a shift ip. the sector's share of national
employment.

The decomposition is accomplished in the following manner:

n
’J
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"jl
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86

When the unions' share of employment in an individual sector is
changed it will be called an intensification shift, and when the sec
tor's share of national employment changes it will be called a domain
shift.

The Intensification Shift
There is an intensification shift (that part of (2) labeled S^)
if the organization ratio within a sector changes, i.e., if the actual
membership in sector j in the terminal year differs from the hypotheti
cal membership which would represent membership growth at the same rate
as employment growth in that sector.

If the intensification shift is

negative, the unions in the sector have failed to maintain their share
of employment in the sector and organized labor is thereby weakened.
*•

This failure may be attributable to any one of a number of reasons,
such as disproportionate growth of white-collar employment, a relative
shift of employment to the South for that employment sector, the growth
of the female proportion of employment in that sector, or the failure
of union leaders to pursue organization goals.
It is noteworthy that an effective union shop agreement will
cause the intensification shift to be positive with every employment
increase (as long as the organization ratio is less than one), and
thus organized labor will gain strength with eqch employment increase.
If all new employees are required to join:.the unions, the proportion
organized must rise as the incremental ratio exceeds the previous aver
age.

At best this gain represents past success of the unions in
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bargaining for the security agreement, and it is not the result of cur
rent organizational efforts.

By the same token, all losses of

employee-members lowers the organization ratio.

The Domain Shift
The sector's share of national employment may decline (rise)
so that the domain of the union shrinks (expands) relative to national
employment.

Even if the unions in sector j were to maintain their

percentage share of employment in the sector (so that there is a zero
intensification shift) there would still be a decline in their con
tribution to the labor movement's share of national employment (a nega
tive net shift) due to the relative decline in employment in their
domain (sector j).

This decline in the sector's share of national

employment is called the domain shift and is the part of equation (2)
labeled s4.
J
d
S
j

(3)
*

(4)

As expressed in (4) the domain shift is the difference between that
hypothetical membership which would just maintain the union share of
sectoral employment [

and that hypothetical membership

jwhich would just maintain the union share of national employment

The domain shift is based on relative shifts in employment
among industries.

A shift of employment out of one industry is offset

by shifts into others.

The resultant shifts in membership do not sum to zero since the ratio
of membership to employment varies among the industries.

A general

shift of employment toward less highly organized industries will create
a tendency for the national net shift to be negative.
The national intensification and domain shifts are obtained by
summing the intensification and domain shifts for each sector.
Symbolically,

where S* is the national intensification shift and

is the national

1fi
domain shift. °
n

•

J

Of course, some of the Sj, Sj, and Sj may be positive and some
negative.

The calculation by sector allows one to pinpoint those sec

tors, and particular unions in some cases, which have contributed sig
nificantly to the national net shift and the nature of their contribution.
It is also possible to determine whether the intensification effect or
the domain effect was on balance more important in determining the
national net shift.

n

CHAPTER V

AN EMPIRICAL EVALUATION OF SOME OF THE EXPLANATIONS
OF UNION MEMBERSHIP GROWTH

The long-run growth of organized labor was discussed in
Chapter II, where it was shown that despite some periods of slow mem
bership growth, and even of actual declines, the growth of the labor
movement since the turn of the century has been impressive.

Union

membership has grown as a proportion of both the labor force and nonagricultural employment.

The most impressive growth occurred during

the two decades following the passage of the National Labor Relations
Act in 1935.

Following that period, however, membership began to

decline relative to employment,

initially even declining in absolute

numbers.
Some of the proposed explanations for union membership growth
would explain the recent relative stagnation in union membership as
being most probably temporary in nature.*"

Other students of the labor

movement interpret this decline as the evidence of a crisis for orga
nized labor and possibly the onset of a secular decline in the

*-See, for example, Bernstein, "The Growth of American Unions,"
p. 318; and Taft, "Is There a Crisis in the Labor Movement? No,"
p. 11.
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movement's strength and influence.^

They offer explanations for the

decline which support a secular stagnation thesis, but the explanations
have been offered with very little empirical support.

The purpose of

this chapter is to examine some of these claims in the light of empiri
cal evidence.

The shift-share technique is utilized in the first

section to examine the hypothesis that changes in the industrial compo
sition of employment have weakened the union movement.

Next a modifi

cation of the shift-share technique and simple rank-order correlation
is used to assess the operational significance for membership growth
of the relative decline of production worker employment, and the rela
tive increase in employment in the South.

The Shift of Employment to Less Unionized Sectors
Membership and employment data by employment sector for the
years 1958 and 1968 are presented in Table 7.
sent membership as a percentage of employment.

The last columns pre
Between 1958 and 1968

union membership rose by approximately 2,032,000 members, or by 11.5
per cent.

At the same time nonagricultural employment increased by

more than 16,310,000, or 32.1 per cent.

As a consequence the propor>•

tion unionized fell from 34.8 to 29.4 per cent of employment.

2

See, for example, Barkin, The Decline of the Labor Movement,
pp. 30-52; Shister, "The Direction of Unionism 1947-1967:
Thrust or
Drift?" pp. 578-601; "Obstacles to Future Union Growth," Fortune,
pp. 51-54; Kassalow, "Occupational Frontiers of Trade Unionism in the
United States," pp. 166-82; Marshall, "Ethnic and Economic Minorities:
Unions' Future or Unrecruitable?" pp. 63-73; Solomon and Burns,
"Unionization of White-Collar Employees:
Extent, Potential and Impli
cations," pp. 160-65; and Burns, "Unionization of the White-Collar
Worker," pp. 56-66.

TABLE 7
UNION MEMBERSHIP AND NONAGRICULTURAL EMPLOYMENT FOR SELECTED SECTORS:

Union
Membership3
Sectors

(000's)
1958

1968

8,124

8,837

1,029

Change

1958-1968

Nonagriculturalb
Employment

Organization
Ratio

(000's)

(Per Cent)

1958

1968

713

15,414

919

-110

1,228

1,192

775

Change

1958

1968

19,009

3,595

52.7

46.5

1,867

1,866

-1

55.1

49.2

-36

2,450

2,755

305

50.1

43.3

915

140

1,540

1,763

223

50.3

51.9

346

375

29

873

1,065

193

39.7

35.2

540

724

184

1,362

1,778

416

39.6

40.7

251

295

44

562

636

73

44.6

46.4

and Equipment
Transportation
Equipment
Mining and
Quarrying
Contract
Construction

2, 700

3,084

384

5,166

7,108

1,943

52.3

43.4

1,255

1,333

78

1,595

2,039

444

78.7

65.4

622

342

-280

751

606

-145

82.8

56.4

2,324

2,541

217

2,778

3,285

507

83.7

77.4

Transportation

2,712

2,503

-209

2,506

2,674

168

108.2e

93.6

Communications

409

476

67

860

982

122

47.6

48.5

Public Utilities

259

324

65

610

654

43

42.4

49.6

Total Manufacturing
Food, Beverage,
and Tobacco
Clothing, Textiles
and Leather Goods
Wood Products
Printing and
Publishing
Petroleum, Chemi

cals, and Rubber
Stone, Clay, and
Glass

Metals, Machinery,

VD

ro

TABLE 7--Continued

Nonagriculturalb
Employment

Union
Membership3

Organization
Ratio

Sectors
(000's)

(000's)
1958
Trade
Finance, Insurance,
and Real Estate

1968

Change

1958

1968

(Per Cent)
Change

1958

1968

852

1,392

540

10,750

14,084

3,334

7.9

9.9

104

50

-54

2,519

3,382

863

4.1

1.5

Services

1,240

1,093

-147

6,806

10,623

3,817

18.2

10.3

Government

1,035

2,155

1,120

7,839

11,845

4,006

13.2

18.2

17,681

19,713

2,032

50,834

67,144

16,310

34.8

29.4

14,450

15,023

573

22,920

27,210

4,290

63.0

55.2

3,231

4,690

1,459

27,914

39,934

12,020

11.6

11.7

Total:

All Sectors

Sum of the More
Unionized Sectors0
Sum of the Less
Unionized Sectors^

^.S., Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Handbook of Labor Statistics 1970, Bulletin 1666 (Washing
ton, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970), pp. 335, 337.
Calculated from U.S., Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment and Earnings. United States.
1909-70. Bulletin 1312-7 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971), passim.
clncludes all Manufacturing sectors, Mining and Quarrying, Contract Construction, Transportation, Communications,
Public Utilities.
^Includes Trade; Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate; Services; and Government.
Estimated membership is greater than estimated employment in Transportation. This is most probably due to a
misallocation of membership among the sectors, although it could also result from overstated membership for the unions
involved.
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Those sectors in which the ratio of membership to employment
is above the average (above .348 in 1958) are aggregated and labelled
"More Unionized Sectors," leaving the rest of the sectors in the "Less
Unionized Sectors."

O

The former group includes all the sectors in

Manufacturing, plus Mining, Construction, Transportation, Communica
tions, and Public Utilities.

Approximately 80 per cent of all union

members were employed in these more unionized sectors in 1958, but only
45 per cent of total employment was found in those sectors.

By 1968,

approximately 76 of all members were in those same sectors and the
proportion of total employment found in those sectors was down to
approximately 40 per cent.

Thus, there was a relative shift of both

employment and union membership toward the less unionized sectors.
The less unionized group includes Trade; Finance, Insurance, and Real
Estate; Services; and Government.
For the ten-year period covered by Table 7, six of the seventeen sectors show net declines of union membership.

4

The largest

declines were in Mining and Transportation, with both losing more than
200,000 members.

These losses represent significantly different per

centage declines, however.

Membership in Mining fell by 45 per cent

O
-'This dichotomy is not strained, for the gap between the groups
is large. The lowest percentage organized in the more unionized group
is 35.2 per cent and the highest organization rate among the less
unionized group is 18.2 per cent.
^The net change does not reflect the magnitude of intra
sectoral changes, of course. Thus, the amount of detail achieved in
the selection of sectors is crucial to the results of an empirical
description. We have used the most detailed sectoral categorization
permitted by the membership data.
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whereas the loss in Transportation was only 8 per cent.
declined by more than 10 per cent in four sectors:
Finance, and Services.

Membership

Food, Mining,

There were only two sectors in which total

employment declined between 1958 and 1968 (Food and Mining), and in
both of these union membership also fell.
The proportion of employees who are unionists declined in all
those sectors which showed decreases in membership and in four addi
tional sectors.

The four sectors in which membership increased, but

proportionately less than employment, were Printing, Metals, Transpor
tation Equipment and Construction.

The most significant decline in

the percentage organized was in Mining (down from 82.8 to 56.4 per
cent).

There was also a noteworthy reduction in the proportion orga■j'

nized in Transportation Equipment (down from 78.7 to 65.4 per cent).
The most spectacular increases in union membership were in
Government (where membership more than doubled) and in Trade (where
it rose by 60 per cent).
and Construction.

There were substantial increases in Metals

However, employment grew even more rapidly in these

last two and the proportion organized in them declined.
Although the proportion organized increased in seven of the
seventeen sectors,

there were no noticeably large increases to paral

lel the decreases described above.
Membership in the more unionized sectors as a group increased
by a bare 4.0 per cent, and the organization ratio fell from 63.0 to
55.2 per cent, due to a more rapid increase in employment.

Membership

in the less unionized group of sectors increased by 45.2 per cent but
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the proportion organized rose only slightly (from 11.6 to 11.7 per
cent) because of the almost equally rapid increase in employment.
It is this relative shift of employment from the more unionized
sectors to the less unionized sectors which has been offered as an
explanation for the overall decline in the proportion organized.

This

claim may be stated as an hypothesis to be tested empirically:
Hypothesis One:

A significant cause of the overall decline in the ratio
of union membership to nonagricultural employment has
been the relatively more rapid growth of employment in
the less unionized sectors.

It is apparent from the last two rows in Table 7 that employ
ment growth in the less unionized sectors far outweighed employment
growth in the more unionized sectors, both in absolute and percentage
terms.

However, union membership growth was also much greater in the

less unionized sectors.

Shift-share analysis facilitates the compari

son and evaluation of relative growth patterns such as this.
The domain shift (using the terminology of Chapter IV) is a
measure of the potential impact on the overall proportion organized
caused by shifts in employment among sectors with varying degrees of
unionization.

The net shift is the difference between the actual mem

bership and that membership which would have just maintained the orga
nization ratio of some former time.

The net shift may be viewed as

the result of two component shifts:

the intensification shift and the

domain shift.^

The null hypothesis for Hypothesis One is stated:

decline in the national organization ratio is not significantly

^See equation (2), p. 85.

the
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affected by the relative shift of employment among the sectors.

This

null hypothesis must be rejected if the national domain shift is found
to be a considerable contributor to the national net shift, and thus '
we would accept Hypothesis One.
It must be acknowledged, indeed it must be stressed, that the
choice exercised in dividing the whole into sectors may alter the rela
tive size of the national intensification and domain shifts, although
it does not affect the national net shift.

In general, the fewer sec

tors or divisions used, the smaller the national domain shift and the
larger the national intensification shift.

In fact, if the whole is

not divided at all, the domain shift is zero.

This is an argument for

making use of as many sectoral divisions as possible, which is what is
done in this case.

Nevertheless, a more detailed subdivision of sec

tors would likely yield results different from those reported here.
Table 8 was calculated by applying the shift-share technique
to the membership and employment data in Table 7.

The first column,

which represents the net shift, is decomposed into an intensification
shift (column two) and a domain shift (column three).

The intensifi

cation shift represents the difference between the actual union mem
bership in the sector and the hypothetical membership which would just
maintain the organization ratio in the sector, given the employment
growth'which occurred.
The sum of the intensification shifts in all sectors is the
national intensification shift, and it is a measure of the effect on
the national share attributable to the success or failure of unions to
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TABLE 8
SHIFT-SHARE ANALYSIS OF UNION MEMBERSHIP AND NONAGRICULTURAL
EMPLOYMENT FOR SELECTED SECTORS:
1958-1968
(Thousands of Members)

Net
Shift

Sectors

Total Manufacturing
Food, Beverage, and Tobacco
Clothing, Textiles, and Leather Goods
Wood Products
Printing and Publishing
Petroleum, Chemicals, and Rubber
Stone, Clay, and Glass
Metals, Machinery, and Equipment
Transportation Equipment
Mining and Quarrying
Contract Construction
Transportation
Communications
Public Utilities
Trade
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate
Services
Government
Total:

All Sectors

Sum of the More Unionized Sectors3
Sum of the Less Unionized Sectors^

-

-

1,894
440
430
109
82
11
37
482
325
480
529
1,079
64
18
267
87
545
788

Intensi
fication
Shift
- 1,190
109 .
189
28
47
19
11
631
271
160
207
391
9
47
276
90
842
591

Domain
Shift

704
331
241
136
35
8
48
149
53
320
322
688
73
65
9
2
298
197

-

- 3,641

- 1,958

- 1,683

_

- 1,893
65

_

4,063
422

2,171
488

0

Includes all Manufacturing sectors, Mining and Quarrying,
Contract Construction, Transportation, Communications, Public
Utilities.
^Includes Trade; Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate; Services;
and Government.
Calculated from Table 7.
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maintain the percentage organized in the various sectors.

If member

ship in each sector were to grow at the same rate as employment, so
that the organization, ratio in each sector remained unchanged, there
would be no national intensification shift, and the national membership
would then depend on the growth of employment in each sector.
Employment grows at different rates in the various sectors,
and the divergence between the growth rate in each sector and the
growth rate for the aggregate of all sectors causes the sectoral shares
of aggregate employment to change or shift.

Shares in some sectors

rise while those in other sectors fall; and, although some shifts are
therefore positive and some negative, the sum of the shares must still
be unity and the sum of the shifts must therefore be zero.

Even

though the employment shifts must offset each other, with total gains
equal to total losses, the shifts occur among sectors with differing
degrees of unionization.

Even if each sector were to realize no

change in its organization ratio, the national organization ratio can
change because of these shifts of employment among sectors with differ
ent degrees of organization.

The national domain shift, which is the

sum of the domain shifts in all sectors, is an indicator of the effect
on the national share caused by employment shifting among sectors with
varying proportions of workers organized.

Employment shifting from

well organized industries to less well organized sectors, for example,
reduces organized labor's share of total employment unless this move
ment is offset by a positive intensification shift.
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According to Table 8, all three of the national shifts for
1958-1968 are negative.

If total membership had grown as rapidly as

total employment, so that organized labor's share of employment had
remained unchanged, the national net shift would have been zero.

The

national net shift of -3,641,000 indicates that total membership in
1968 was just that much too low, when compared to employment in 1968,
for the maintenance of the share that existed in 1958 (34.8 per cent).
The national intensification shift was -1,958,000, which means
that had the unions just maintained the 1958 organization ratio in
each employment sector, the total hypothetical membership in 1968
would have been greater than the actual membership by 1,958,000 mem
bers, and total membership as a percentage of total employment in 1968
would have been 32.3 instead of 29.4 per cent.

The intensification

shift accounts for 53.7 per cent of the national net shift.

The bal

ance, -1,683,000 (or 46.2 per cent) is attributable to the domain
shift.

This is a substantial portion of the net shift.

Thus Hypothe

sis One is not contradicted by the data, and we may not deny its place
among the possible explanations of the decline in the national organi
zation ratio.
Two important conclusions can be drawn from this result.
There was an unfavorable shift of employment from relatively highly
unionized sectors to less unionized sectors.
large negative national domain shift.

This is shown by the*

However, this movement explains

less than half of the national net shift.

The failure of membership
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ratios to be maintained in each sector was even more important in
causing the decline of the national organization ratio.
The sectoral distribution of the shifts is of some interest.
The national organization ratio cannot increase unless membership
grows more rapidly than national employment.

As evidenced by positive

net shifts in Table 8 , there were only three sectors (Petroleum,
Trade, and Government) in which union membership grew more rapidly
than national employment.

In all three of these sectors membership

also rose as a proportion of sector employment.

Government is the only

sector (of the seventeen included here) for which all three shifts of
the shift-share analysis are positive.

However, employment growth in

both Petroleum and Trade was less rapid than national employment
growth.

Although the organization ratio increased in four additional

sectors (Wood Products, Stone, Communications, and Public Utilities),
employment in those sectors grew less rapidly than the national aggre
gate.

In other words, the increased degree of unionization in Petro

leum, Trade, Wood Products, Stone, Communications, and Public Utilities
was aided by below average growth in employment in these sectors.
There were only four sectors in which employment shifts were
positive (Metals, Finance, Services, and Government).

In the first

three of these membership failed to keep pace with sectoral employment;
although, as noted, sectoral employment advanced at an above average
rate.

However, the net shift for these sectors was also negative,

indicating that membership failed to grow as rapidly as average
employment.
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Production Worker Employment and Union Membership
A plausible explanation for at least part of the negative
intensification shifts in membership is that during the period under
consideration nonproduction worker employment rose relative to produc
tion worker employment.

For those who hold that the production worker

is the traditional source of union membership,

such a change shrinks

the domain of the union movement relative to total employment but is
not included in the domain shift as defined in the preceding shiftshare analysis, showing up instead in the intensification shift.
It has been well established that most union members are pro
duction or blue-collar workers.^

In 1968 blue-collar workers held

approximately 84.3 per cent of all union membership cards, and whitecollar members, though growing as a proportion of the total, still were
less than 16 per cent of total membership.

Furthermore, the estimated

organization rate among blue-collar workers was almost seven times
greater than the rate among white-collar workers (64.8 per cent as
opposed to 9.4 per cent).

O

Production worker employment data by sector are presented in
Table 9.

The sectors included in the table are those for which the

6
See, for instance, Barkin, The Decline of the Labor Movement,
pp. 42-50; Shister, "The Direction of Unionism 1947-1967:
Thrust or
Drift?" pp. 580-83; and Burns, "Unionization of the White Collar
Worker," pp. 56-66.
^See above:

Table 5, p. 55.

®See Table 5, p. 55. These estimates are aggregative totals
for all employment sectors combined.

TABLE 9
PRODUCTION WORKER EMPLOYMENT FOR SELECTED SECTORS:

Sectors

1958-1968

Production Worker Employment

Percentage of
Total Employment

1958

1958

1968

Change

(Thousands)
Total Manufacturing
Food, Beverage, and Tobacco
Clothing, Textiles, and Leather Goods
Wood Products
Printing and Publishing
Petroleum, Chemicals, and Rubber
Stone, Clay, and Glass
Metals, Machinery, and Equipment
Transportation Equipment
Mining and Quarrying
Contract Construction
Total: These Sectors

11,615
1,306
2,190
1,302
563
905
458
3,770
1,121
611
2,384
14,610

13,981
1,264
2,427
1,447
667
1,163
509
5,065
1,441
461
2,768
17,210

1968

(Per Cent)
2,366
- 42
237
144
104
258
51
295
1,
321
- 150
384
2,600

75.4
69.9
89.4
84.6
64.5
66.4
81.4.
73.0
70.3
81.4
85.8
77.1

Calculated from U.S., Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment and
Earnings, United States, 1909-70, Bulletin 1666 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1971), passim.

73.6
67.7
88.1
82.1
62.6
65.4
80.1
71.3
70.7
76.1
84.3
75.2
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term "production worker" is well defined and for which the source data
are therefore comparable.

Approximately 60 per cent of all union mem

bers were employed in these ten sectors during the period covered.^
The last two columns in Table 9 show production worker employ
ment as a percentage of total employment in each sector.

The majority

of employees in each of these sectors are production workers, and the
proportion varies from 62.6 to 89.4 per cent of total employment.

How

ever, the ratio of production worker employment to total employment
declined between 1958 and 1968 in each sector except Transportation
Equipment.

In most sectors both production and nonproduction worker

employment increased, and the decline in the ratio reflected the faster
growth of nonproduction worker employment.

Both production worker

employment and total employment declined in two sectors (Food and
Mining); but in both the total employment decline was less than the
production worker decline, which indicates that nonproduction worker
employment increased in these sectors while production worker employ
ment declined.
If union membership is related more closely to production
worker employment than to total employment, there should be a discern
ible correlation between production worker employment and union member
ship among the sectors, and that relationship should be stronger than
the relationship between membership and total employment.

Even more

importantly for the purpose at hand, we should expect to find a

^Calculated from Table 7.
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significant correlation between changes in membership and changes in
production worker employment, *>nd this correlation should also be more
pronounced than the correlation between changes in membership and
total employment.

Our testable hypothesis can be stated in two parts:

Hypothesis Two
A. Union membership is directly related to production worker
employment.
B. Changes in union membership are directly related to changes
in production worker employment.
Part A of Hypothesis Two can be tested by calculating the rankorder correlation coefficient for the percentage organized and the per
centage who are production workers in the ten sectors of Table 9.

If

this correlation is significant at the 10 per cent level, we will
reject the null hypothesis (that union membership is not directly
related to production worker employment).

The correlation coefficients

obtained are + .3576 for 1958 and + .4303 for 1968, neither of which
is significant at the 10 per cent level for 10 observations.^-®

Thus,

the null hypothesis is not.rejected, and Part A of Hypothesis Two is
not given strong empirical support.
Even if the concentration of union membership and production
worker employment were closely related, that would not in itself sub
stantiate the claim that changes in membership are directly related to
changes in production worker employment.

The null hypothesis to be

■^The table of critical values used in all correlation tests
is that provided by Gerald J. Glasser and Robert F. Winter, "Critical
Values of the Coefficient of Rank Correlation for Testing the Hypothe
sis of Independence," Biometrika, XLVIII (December, 1961), 447. The
Spearman coefficient is used for all correlation tests in this chapter.
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tested in this case is that changes in membership are not directly
related to changes in production worker employment.
of change may be used.

Several measures

The correlation coefficient for percentage

changes in membership and production worker employment is + .5394
which is significant at the 10 per cent level.

However, the correla

tion coefficient for percentage changes in membership and in total
employment is larger (+ .6242), and is significant at the 5 per cent
level.

This would indicate a closer relationship between membership

changes and total employment changes than between membership and pro
duction worker employment changes.
When the sectors are ranked according to the change in the
ratio of membership to total employment and according to the change in
the ratio of production workers to total employment, the rank-order
correlation coefficients are so low that they fail to indicate any
relationship at all.

This is true for the coefficient for ranking the

absolute changes in the ratios (+ .0182), and for the coefficient for
ranking the percentage changes in the ratios (+ .1636).^
These tests of the association between union membership and
production worker employment indicate no basis for expecting member
ship to respond more closely to production worker employment changes
than to nonproduction worker employment changes.

That is to deny the

special dependence of union membership on production worker employment
and consequently to deny the validity of Part B of Hypothesis Two.

11-The absolute change in the ratio is the numerical difference
between the 1958 ratio and the 1968 ratio. The percentage change in
the ratio is the quotient of the absolute change and the initial ratio.

If Hypothesis Two were operationally valid, the failure of
membership to maintain its percentage of employment in these ten sec
tors (as evidenced by negative intensification shifts) could be
attributed to the relative decline in production:worker employment in
the sectors.

The shift-share technique can be modified to indicate the

portion of the intensification shift which could reasonably be attributed
to the relative change in employment from production workers to nonpro
duction workers.
The procedure may be explained symbolically by adapting the
notation used above.

Let the first subscript, in E^

the employment sector.
more than one way:

continue to denote

Employment in a sector can be categorized in

union members and nonmembers, production workers

and nonproduction workers, etc.

Let the letter "p" in the second sub

script position indicate the production worker portion of employment,
and let the letter "m" in that position indicate the portion of employ
ment which belongs to unions.
of course.

These classifications are nonadditive,

Thus, E m is membership in all sectors combined, E ^

is

production worker employment in the jth sector, and E. is total
J•
employment in the jth sector.

The intensification shift of membership

in sector j, using the adapted notation, is
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If union membership were primarily a function of production
worker employment, the union share of employment in a sector could be
decomposed into two ratios:

E•

E.

E.

E i

E 4« E 4

ZJB = Ji! J £
J*

JP

J*

Thus the intensification shift (the shift in the share on the left of
the equality) may be decomposed into a shift in the union share of pro
duction worker employment in the sector and a shift resulting from a
change in the production worker share of total employment in the sec
tor.

Symbolically:
i
S.
j

= E .
Jm

*

E .*
IE. E.
E,
Jm
Jr

*

l
j

=

a

UE E
E,
jm
jP

S

E.*
ItE.
E^
jm
j

•

Ei
+

+
j

Ei *
— IE E
E,
jm
Jr

E•*

= E .
Jm

S

+

-Jm|
E, v
jPN

j-

b
S.
J

The term labeled Sj is related to the shift sj in the same way
that S^ is related to the net shift S? in the preceding section; and
in this sense S^ is analogous to the intensification shift.

Sj is the

difference between actual membership and that membership which would
have just maintained the union share of production worker employment.
Sj would be zero if membership were to grow at the same rate as pro
duction worker employment.
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The second element, S j, is analogous to the domain shift.

If

there is a shift in the production worker share of total employment in
the sector,- and if membership were to vary proportionately with producI.

tion worker employment, the shift Sj would be an indication of the
effect of the change in employment patterns, from production workers
to nonproduction workers, on membership.

This much of the intensifi

cation shift of membership could be considered to be the result of the
shift of employment away from production workers, and if the decreasing
production worker share is an important explanation of the slow growth
of membership, the Sj shift should be a major component of the negative
intensification shift of membership.
Table 10 shows the decomposition of the intensification shift
for the ten sectors included in Table 9.

The sum of the S. shows the
J

change in union membership which would have taken place due to the
shift of employment from production workers to nonproduction workers,
provided the ratio of membership to production worker had remained the
same in each sector.

This shift (-269,000) was only 17.3 per cent of

the total intensification shift for these ten sectors (-1,557,000).
In no single sector does the shift in the production worker share of
employment, as evaluated by S^, account for as much as one'-half of the
intensification shift for that sector.
It is interesting to note that only three sectors of these ten
achieved positive intensification shifts in membership (Wood Products,
Petroleum, and Stone), and they did so in the face of declining produc
tion worker shares of total employment.

Furthermore, the only sector

110

TABLE 10
DECOMPOSITION OF THE INTENSIFICATION SHIFT [Sj] IN
SELECTED SECTORS TO ALLOW FOR SHIFTS IN PRODUC
TION WORKER EMPLOYMENT:
1958-1968

Sectors

Sa
Sj

Sj

Sb
Sj

(Thousands)
Total Manufacturing
Food, Beverage,
and Tobacco
Clothing, Textiles,
and Leather Goods
Wood Products
Printing and
Publishing
Petroleum, Chemi
cals, and Rubber
Stone, Clay, and
Glass
Metals, Machinery,
and Equipment
Transportation
Equipment
Mining and
Quarrying
Contract
Construction
Total:

All Sectors

- 1,190

- 1,004

109

77

-

33

189

169

-

20

28

54

-

26

47

35

-

13

19

30

-

11

11

16

631

-

543

186

5
-

88

271

281

9

160

127

-

33

207

157

-

50

- 1,557

- 1,288

- 269

See text, pp. 108-109, for definition of the second and third
columns (Sj and S^).
Calculated from Tables 7, 8, and 9.
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in which production worker employment rose relative to total employ
ment was Transportation Equipment, and this was the sector with the
second largest negative intensification shift of all ten sectors.
Thus, the statistical correlation of changes in membership and
production worker employment by sector provides a secure basis for
rejecting the hypothesis that membership relies more heavily on produc
tion worker employment than other components of the work force.

In

addition, the shift-share analysis shows that the relative change in
production worker employment cannot explain the failure of unions to
maintain their share of total employment in these sectors.
sectors

These ten

constitute a fair sample because they contain over 60 per cent

of all union membership and over 60 per cent of all blue-collar
workers.^

The Shift of Employment to the South
As shown in Chapter III, the percentage of those employed who
belong to unions is greatest in the New England, Middle Atlantic, East
North Central, and Pacific regions.

Table 6 (page 64) showed that the

rate of participation in unions in these regions is more than twice as
great as in the South.

The low rate of organization in the South has

attracted particular attention because the South provides a substan
tial portion (24.4 per cent in 1968) of national employment, and
employment in the South is growing almost twice as rapidly as
19
A^U.S., Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics,
Occupational Employment Patterns for 1960 and 1975. Bulletin 1599
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1968), Table 4, p. 16.
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employment in the East and East North Central regions where unions are
stronger.
Several writers have noted the low organization rate in the
South, and the failure of various attempts by organized labor to
increase unionization in the South, and they have offered explanations
for the lower unionization of the South.

13

The explanations are of two different types.

Frederic Meyers

attributed the low organization rate to the "pre-industrial" structure
of Southern employment, i.e., the overall organization rate•in the
South is low because employment in the South is concentrated in sectors
which are not highly unionized in other regions e i t h e r . ^

According

to this view, if the pattern of Southern employment were to become
more similar to that of the rest of the nation, we should expect the
organization rate in the South to approach the national average.

As a

testable hypothesis, this explanation may be stated:
Hypothesis Three:

There is an inverse relationship between the South
ern share of employment in a sector and the percent
age organized in the sector.

Other explanations of the low incidence of unionization in the
South are based on socioeconomic features of Southern employment.

13

See, for instance, Troy, "The Growth of Union Membership in
the South, 1939-1953," pp. 407-8; Barkin, The Decline of the Labor
Movement, pp. 15, 30-32; Marshall, "Ethnic and Economic Minorities:
Unions' Future or Unrecruitable?" p. 69.
^
•^Frederic Meyers, "The Growth of Collective Bargaining in
Texas--A Newly Industrialized Area," (Mimeographed paper read at the
Annual Convention of the Industrial Relations Research Association,
1954), p. 5. Cited in Troy, "The Growth of Union Membership in the
South, 1939-1953," p. 408.
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According to this interpretation,

the Southern employee is less likely

than employees in other regions to become a union member.

Our testable

hypothesis is:
Hypothesis Four:

There is an inverse relationship between the shift
of employment to the South and the growth of union
membership.

Table 11 contains the Southern employment data for 1958 and
1968.^

The last two columns show Southern employment as a percentage

of national employment for each sector.

These ratios document the rise

in the Southern share of national employment for all sectors.

The

South's share of employment is especially large in Mining and in Clothing,

16

and the Southern share is especially small in Mefals, Transpor

tation Equipment, Printing, and Public Utilities.

The ratio of

Southern to total employment is slightly higher for the group of less
unionized sectors.

However, the ratio for the more unionized sectors

advanced faster between 1958 and 1968 than the ratio in the less
unionized sectors.

This indicates that the gain in Southern employ

ment, relative to the rest of the nation, was proceeding at a faster
rate in the better organized sectors than in the less organized sectors.

^ T h e data were summed from two-digit industry data by state.
The states included in the South are the same as those included in
Table 6 : Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Texas, and Virginia.
^ T h e sector Clothing includes Textiles which is the real
source of Southern concentration in this sectoral group.
In 1968, 69.6
per cent of all Textile employment was located in the South. Calcu
lated from U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employ
ment and Earnings, States and Areas, 1939-69, Bulletin 1370-7 (Wash
ington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970), passim.

TABLE 11
NONAGRICULTURAL EMPLOYMENT IN THE SOUTH FOR SELECTED SECTORS:

Sectors

Southern
Employment
1958

TTmnl n v m o n t *

(000)
Total Manufacturing
Food, Beverage,
arid Tobacco
Clothing, Textiles,
and Leather Goods
Wood Products
Printing and
Publishing
Petroleum, Chemi
cals, and Rubber
Stone, Clay, and
Glass
Metals, Machinery,
and Equipment
Transportation
Equipment
Mining and
Quarrying
Contract
Construction

(000)

Per Cent of
National
Employment
1958

(Per Cent)

1968

(Per Cent)

2,940

4,286

1,346

45.8

19.1

22.5

458

507

49

10.7

24.5

27.2

873

1,244

371

42.5

35.6

45.1

492

591

99

20.0

31.9

33.5

116

166

50

43.1

13.3

15.6

286

406

120

41.9

21.0

22.9

109

150

41

37.9

19.4

23.6

427

913

485

113.5

8.3

12.8

179

310

131

73.0

11.2

15.2

329

282

- 47

- 14.2

43.7

46.5

744

1,020

111

37.2

26.8

31.1

482

641

159

33.0

19.2

24.0
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Transportation

P.Han era •

1958- 1968

1968

1958-1968

TABLE 11— Continued

Sectors

Per Cent of
National
Employment

Southern
Employment
1958

1968
(000)

Communications

1958- 1968
(000)

1958

(Per Cent)

1968

(Per Cent)

177

255

79

44.5

20.5

26.0

76

108

32

42.0

12.5

16.5

Trade
Finance, Insurance,
and Real Estate

2,575

3,516

942

36.6

24.0

25.0

509

752

243

47.7

20.2

22.2

Services

1,413

2,330

917

64.9

20.8

21.9

Government

2,025

3,107

1,082

53.4

25.8

26.2

11,269

16,298

5,028

44.6

22.2

24.3

4,747

6,592

1,845

38.9

20.7

24.2

6,523

9,706

3,183

48.8

23.4

24.3

Public Utilities

Total:
All Sectors
Sum of the More
Unionized Sectors3
Sum of the Less
Unionized Sectors*5

Includes all Manufacturing sectors, Mining and Quarrying, Contract Construction, Trans
portation, Communications, Public Utilities.
^Includes Trade; Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate; Services; and Government.
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°Calculated from Table 7 and U.S., Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics,
Employment and Earnings. States and Areas, 1939-1969, Bulletin 1370-7 (Washington, D.C.:
Govern
ment Printing Office, 1971), passim. Sectoral employment for the following states were calcu
lated and then aggregated for the South: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and
Virginia.
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The greatest increases in Southern employment were in Metals,
Transportation Equipment, Services, and Government.

Southern employ

ment more than doubled in Metals during this period and rose by at
least 50 per cent in the other three named sectors.

Mining employment

declined in the South as well as nationally, but proportionately less
in the South; so, the Southern share of Mining employment increased.
Although national employment declined in the Food sector, Southern
employment in this sector grew by 10.7 per cent.
Hypothesis Three may be tested by ranking theseventeen

sec

tors of Table 11 according to membership as a percentage of total
employment and according to Southern employment as a percentage of
total employment.

The null hypothesis in this instance is that there

is no observed relationship between the degree of unionization and the
degree of concentration in the South.

The coefficients of rank order

correlation for 1958 and 1968 are small (+ .0662 and + .2500 respec
tively) and not significant at the 10 per cent level.

This is no

basis for rejecting the null hypothesis, and so it must stand;which
leaves us with no support for Hypothesis T h r e e . ^
Leo Troy also rejected Meyer's explanation, using a different
method.

Troy calculated a "hypothetical" Southern membership for the

years 1939 and 1953 by applying the national organization ratio for

l^The Textile industry is a marked exception to this general
conclusion. It is highly concentrated in the South (see note 16), and
its percentage organized is low, 19.2 per cent in 1968. The member
ship figure is calculated from U.S. Department of Labor, Directory of
Unions 1969. p. 73.
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each sector to the Southern employment for that sector In those years.
Dividing the actual Southern union membership for these years by this
hypothetical membership, Troy concluded that Southern membership was
approximately one-half of its potential level (54.6 per cent in 1939
and 57.7 per cent in 1953).

18

The same calculations, using 1968

employment and membership data, show a hypothetical Southern membership for 1968 of 4,875,000.

19

The actual membership reported for the
on

Southern states was 2,567,000,
thetical membership.

which is 52.7 per cent of the hypo

The necessary conclusion is that something other

than the sectoral structure of Southern employment is the cause of the
low degree of unionization in the South.
The null hypothesis for Hypothesis Four is that there is no
observed relationship between the shift of employment to the South and
growth of union membership.

When the seventeen sectors of Table 11 are

ranked according to the percentage change in Southern employment and
according to the percentage change in union membership,

the coefficient

of rank correlation is so small (+ .0343) as to indicate that if a
relationship exists, it is not operationally significant.

When the

sectors are ranked according to the change in the ratio of membership
to total employment (which indicates a shift in the union share of

l^Troy, "The Growth of Union Membership in the South, 19391953," p. 414.
IQ

The percentage organized data from Table 7 were applied to
the Southern employment data of Table 11.
^calculated from U.S. Department of Labor, Directory of
Unions 1969. Table 10, p. 76.
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sectoral employment) and according to the change in the ratio of
Southern to national employment (which indicates a shift in the South
ern share of national employment) the coefficient of rank correlation
is -.4118, which is significant at the 5 per cent level.

21

This

k

result enables us to reject the null hypothesis of no relationship and
to accept Hypothesis Four.
It should be remembered that the shift of employment to the
South, and the potentially detrimental effect of that shift for the
national organization ratio, is only part of the national geographical
shift of employment and, therefore, only part of the implication of
interregional employment shifts for the national degree of unioniza
tion.

It was pointed out in Table 6 that the fastest growing region

in the nation between 1958 and 1968 was the Pacific.

The organiza

tion ratio in this region is also well above the national average
(32.9 per cent for the Pacific in 1958 as opposed to 27.9 for all
regions).

Thus, although the shift of employment to the South is a

potentially limiting factor for the expansion of union membership
(according to Hypothesis Four), the shift to the Pacific region is an
offsetting factor.

Summary and Conclusions
This chapter has provided empirical bases for accepting or
rejecting some of the arguments advanced by various writers to explain
21

By the "change in the ratio" is meant the numerical differ
ence between the percentage organized or employed in the South in 1958
and the percentage organized or employed in the South in 1968.
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the failure of union membership to maintain its percentage of nonagricultural employment.
According to the shift-share analysis of membership and employ
ment, the sectoral shifts of employment were unfavorable to the growth
of the national organization ratio; but, these shifts were less impor
tant for the relative decline of national membership than the failure
of unions to maintain the proportion organized in each sector.

The

correlation of production worker employment and membership growth
indicated that membership is no more responsive to production worker
employment changes than to changes in total employment (production
worker and nonproduction worker employment).

The shift-share analysis

of membership and production worker employment indicated that the fail
ure of membership ratios to be maintained in the various sectors was
only minimally due to the more rapid growth of nonproduction worker
employment in those sectors.

The general conclusion was that the

shift of employment from production worker to nonproduction worker has
been a relatively minor factor in the decline of the national organiza
tion ratio.
However,

the shift of employment to the South was shown to be

inversely related to the growth of unionization among the sectors.
Accordingly, the continued rise in the Southern share of employment
is a potential threat to the maintenance of the national ratio of
union membership to nonagricultural employment.

It must be remembered,

however, that there has been a contemporaneous shift of employment to
the Pacific region where unionization is more secure, and this mitigates
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the net effect of geographical employment shifts on the national orga
nization ratio.

Thus, on balance, the geographical shifts of employ

ment cannot be said to be unequivocably detrimental to the national
organization ratio.
These results cast doubt on the validity of some of the "saturationist" claims.

Other claims of the saturationists remain to be

tested, e.g., the detrimental effects on the organization ratio of the
relative rise in female employment and the shift to smaller communi
ties, or the lack of dynamism in the organized labor movement.

Accord

ing to the results in this chapter, however, the shift of employment
from traditionally more highly unionized sectors to less unionized
sectors, the relatively more rapid increase of the nonproduction
worker, and the geographical shift of employment away from the East
and East North Central regions are not sufficient bases for predicting
the continued decline of the ratio of membership to employment for the
nation as a whole.
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